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INTRODUCTION
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the
machinery of death.
For more than 20 years I have
endeavored-indeed,I have struggled-along with a majority of
this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that
would lend more than the mere appearance of fairness to the
death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle the
Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been
achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally
and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death
penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me
now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive
regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent
constitutionaldeficiencies.
- Justice Harry Blackmun'
The new evangelization calls for followers of Christ who are
unconditionally pro-life: who will acclaim, celebrate and serve
the Gospel of life in every situation. A sign of hope is the
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in Constitutional Law, International Law, Capital Jurisprudence, Military
Tribunals, and Cyberspace Law, among others. His work has appeared in the
Albany Law Review, ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, the
European Law Journal ERA-Forum, and the Toledo Law Review, to name a few. The
author wishes to thank the editorial board of the Journal of Catholic Legal Studies
at St. John's Law School for their dedication to the editing process. Particular
thanks to Professor Rob Vischer of the St. Thomas University Law School for
comments on an earlier draft. Finally, "thank you" to Jennifer Schulke for her
research assistance during the preparation of this manuscript. Dr. Ghoshray can be
reached at sabyghoshray@sbcglobal.net.
1 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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increasingrecognition that the dignity of human life must never
be taken away, even in the case of someone who has done great
evil. Modern society has the means of protecting itself, without
definitely denying criminals the chance to reform.
-Pope John Paul 112
I have reached the point where I can no longer participate in a
legal system that intentionally takes human life in capital
punishment cases ....
We continue to demonstrate that no human is wise enough to
decide who should die ....
-Justice Robert Utter, Washington State Supreme Court 3

The dawn of the new millennium witnessed two significant
Supreme Court decisions that have given a new dimension to the
In Atkins v.
death penalty debate in the United States.
4
Virginia, the Court held capital punishment unconstitutional for6
5
persons with mental retardation, while in Roper v. Simmons,
the Court imposed constitutional bans on the execution of
juveniles. 7 These two decisions marked a quantum jump in the
highest Court's maturation process since the watershed moment
s
of its capital punishment jurisprudence in Furman v. Georgia
banning all executions. 9 But, the two decisions also signaled,
perhaps, for the first time in thirty years, an abolitionist end of
These decisions coincided with
this evolutionary process.
significant historic shifts in the Catholic Church's stance on
capital punishment. Under the leadership of Pope John Paul II,
the Church finally extricated itself from years of confusion over
2 Cacp.org, Catholics Against Capital Punishment: What the Vatican Has Said,
http://cacp.org/vaticandocuments.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2006) (quoting Pope
John Paul II, Homily Delivered at the Papal Mass, St. Louis, Mo. (Jan. 27, 1999),
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/ohn-paul-ii/travels/documents/hfjp-ii-hom_
27011999_stlouisen.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2006)).
3 Jack Hopkins, Death Penalty Inequities Prompt State High Court Justice To
Retire, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 30, 1995, at Al.
4 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
5 See id. at 321.
6 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
7 See id. at 578-79. ('The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid
imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when
their crimes were committed.").
8 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
9 See id. at 239-40 (finding the imposition of three death penalty sentences
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
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the issue of state-sanctioned killings as it took a principled
stance. 10 Now, more than ever, the Catholic Church has shown
10There has been some confusion within the Catholic Church on the death
penalty topic. The past reflects the confusion over whether or not the Church should
support capital punishment or state-sanctioned killings. This confusion is evident in
such statements that refer to the fuzziness within the Catholic community for nearly
twenty-five years on the death penalty. Adding to the confusion, the statement also
notes a specific charge to work toward ending the death penalty.
The statement makes note of a shift over the last 25 years to growing
public distrust for how the death penalty is applied and decreasing support
for its use. It also said the goal of the statement is "not just to proclaim a
position, but to persuade Catholics and others to join us in working to end
the use of the death penalty.
Patricia Zapor, New Statement Calls for the Rejection of "Illusion"of Death Penalty,
CATH. NEWS SERV., Nov. 1, 2005, available at http://www.catholicnews.comldata
stories/cns/0506545.htm

(quoting UNITED

STATES

CONFERENCE

OF

CATHOLIC

BISHOPS, A Culture of Life and the Penalty of Death (Nov. 2005),
http://www.acat.asso.fr/execute/images/penaltyofdeath.pdf (last visited Aug. 29,
2006)). The confusion continues as here again in a 1980 statement that reads in
part:
[T]he bishops.., acknowledge that the Christian tradition has for a long
time recognized a government's right to protect its citizens by using the
death penalty in some serious situations. The bishops ask, however, if
capital punishment is still justifiable in the present circumstances in the
United States.
In this context, the bishops enter the debate about deterrence and
retribution. They acknowledge that capital punishment certainly prevents
the criminal from committing more crimes, yet question whether it
prevents others from doing so. Similarly, concerning retribution, the
bishops support the arguments against death as an appropriate form of
punishment. The bishops add that reform is a third reason given to justify
punishment, but it clearly does not apply in the case of capital punishment.
And so they affirm: "We believe that in the conditions of contemporary
American society, the legitimate purposes of punishment do not justify the
imposition of the death penalty."
Kenneth R. Overberg, S.J., The Death Penalty: Why the Church Speaks a
Countercultural Message, CATH. UPDATE MAG., available at http://www.american
catholic.org/Newsletters/CU/acO195.asp (quoting UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Capital Punishment (Nov. 1980), http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/
nationalcriminaldeathuscc80.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2006)). This confusion has,
in a sense, helped the Church and its leaders to be more public and precise in their
position on the death penalty. If we compare the Catholic Catechism
pronouncements between 1992 and 1997, we find the following changes. While the
original 1994 edition 2265 stated, "Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a
grave duty for someone responsible for another's life, the common good of the family
or of the state," the definitive Latin edition (issued in September 1997) of the
Catechism is different. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
2265 (1994).
Specifically, the 1997 edition of 2265 states:
Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for one who is
responsible for the lives of others. The defense of the common good requires
that an unjust aggressor be rendered unable to cause harm. For this
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principled opposition towards the death penalty. This opposition
can be seen percolating through the Evangelium Vitae and the
reason, those who legitimately hold authority also have the right to use
arms to repel aggressors against the civil community entrusted to their
responsibility.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2265 (2d ed. 1997). Similarly, in his general
audience in St. Peters Square, the Pope expressed his hope that "there no longer be
recourse to capital punishment, given that states today have the means to
efficaciously control crime, without definitively taking away an offender's possibility
to redeem himself." See Cacp.org, supra note 2 (referencing Pope John Paul II,
General Audience, St. Peter's Square (Sept. 13, 2000), http://www.vatican.vafholyfather/john-paul iiaudiences2000/documentslhfjp-ii-aud_20000913_en.html
(in
left hand corner click "Audiences," go to year "2000" tab and then scroll down to
"September 13 2000" tab) (last visited Aug. 29, 2006)). This was followed by his
homily in St. Louis, Mo., where he chastised the practice of the death penalty to be
both cruel and unnecessary while pronouncing to his followers:
The new evangelization calls for followers of Christ who are unconditionally
pro-life: who will acclaim, celebrate and serve the Gospel of life in every
situation. A sign of hope is the increasing recognition that the dignity of
human life must never be taken away, even in the case of someone who has
done great evil. Modern society has the means of protecting itself, without
definitively denying criminals the chance to reform.
Id. (quoting Pope John Paul II, Homily Delivered at the Papal Mass, St. Louis, Mo.
(Jan. 27, 1999), http://www.vatican.vafholyfather/johnpaul iitravelsdocuments/
hf-jp-ii-hom27011999_stlouisen.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2006)). Later, the
Vatican termed the death penalty "a sign of desperation" in a declaration to the first
World Congress on the Death Penalty held June 21-23, 2001 in Strasbourg, France.
Cacp.org, supra note 2 (quoting The Vatican, Declaration to the First World
Congress on the Death Penalty, Strasbourg, France (June 21, 2001)). The Vatican
continued on to lend its support towards an abolitionist policy, as it characterized
the abolition of capital punishment as:
[A]n integral part of the defense of human life at every stage of its
development.... The universal abolition of the death penalty would be a
courageous reaffirmation of the belief that humankind can be successful in
dealing with criminality and of our refusal to succumb to despair before
such forces, and as such it would regenerate new hope in our very
humanity.
Id. Similar sentiments have been echoed throughout the religious Catholic
community beginning in the late 1990s. For example, in a June 20, 2001 address to
members of the organization Priestsfor Life, Archbishop Renato Martino, the Holy
See's ambassador to the United Nations, said: "Our voice must be heard not only in
the fight against abortion, but in the fight against euthanasia and capital
punishment as well. We can never condone the deliberate taking of human life
created in love by God and redeemed in Jesus Christ." Id. (quoting Archbishop
Renato R. Martino, Remarks to the United Nations at the Blessing of the John
Cardinal O'Connor International Headquarters of Priests for Life (June 20, 2001)).
Also significant is the current Pope Benedict's earlier view on the death penalty.
While he was the Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Prefect of the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith, he noted that in modern society it would be "practically
impossible" to fulfill the Catechism's criteria for a death sentence. Cacp.org, supra
note 2.
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new Catholic Catechism." Therefore, an issue we are interested
in exploring is whether the Catholic Church's change in attitude
towards the death penalty signaled the recent shift in the capital
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
This inquiry is motivated by the appearance of a causal
relationship between the Papal jurisprudence of Pope John
Paul II and an evolutionary shift in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Because the current Catholic viewpoint, under
the leadership of the late Pope, fosters an increasing recognition
of the dignity of human life, 12 the Supreme Court's opinion in
both Roper and Atkins echo a similar tone. Through these
opinions, a renewed scope and expanded dimension of the
domestic judiciary's understanding of the Eighth Amendment is
revealed. This research proceeds on multiple threads. In the
first, I examine the evolution of death penalty jurisprudence for
juveniles in Roper, as it traces the tension between the two
competing arguments.
The first argument centers on the
psychological analysis of law 13 that reduces the culpability of the
offender and advances both the morality and the
disproportionality arguments. The other argument insulates the
domestic national consensus from being consumed by the strong
tides of the rising world constitutionalism. The second cluster of
issues is the set of ethical visions that influenced the judiciary in
4 to Atkins
their journey from Penry v. LynaughM
while we

witnessed the emergence of a newer constitutional interpretation
of Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Court's proclamation in
Atkins. As the two parallel themes converge in my analysis, I
argue the success in advancing a capital jurisprudence of
qualitative difference does not require the finding of support in
history or domestic tradition.
Rather, it depends on our
11 See JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE
27, 40-41, 56
[hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE] (discussing the inviolability of life);
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
2267 (2d ed. 1997) (indicating that cases in

(1995)

which the execution of an offender is absolutely necessary are "practically nonexistent").
12 Inherent dignity is, in my mind, the life force of making the human person
inviolable. Throughout the text, I refer to the scope and meaning of inherent human
dignity. For further discussion, see discussion infra note 239.
13 See Elizabeth Cauffman, Jennifer Woolard, & N. Dickon Repucci, Justice for
Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents' Competence and Culpability, 18
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 403, 407-08 (1999) (referencing the effort to identify cognitive
factors that might help explain one's culpability).
14 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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willingness to engage in an inquiry into society's evolving
standards, especially if the historical tradition is infected with a
flawed analysis of proportionality and entangled in the inequality
of Due Process. Herein lies perhaps the greatest of all legacies of
Pope John Paul II. The Catholic Church can at last stand
alongside those human rights group that oppose, unequivocally,
state-sanctioned killing of humans.
In seeking the path of unqualified opposition to abortion and
unyielding ban on almost all types of medical intervention to
fertility, Catholic jurisprudence has embarked on a collision
course in the U.S. where the majority's view fosters the converse
viewpoint of both the evolving Supreme Court and the
contemporary standards of law in other parts of the civilized
world. Against this backdrop, my paper examines whether there
exists any normative alignment between the Catholic Church's
position of principled opposition to the death penalty and the
recent Supreme Court's judicial metamorphosis in its capital
sentencing jurisprudence. In this context, I am interested to
explore the Court's evolution since Furman through the prism of
morality, as I explore in detail the coupling between morality and
jurisprudence. Of particular interest in this inquiry is the moral
consciousness rising within the Court which, at times, gets
subsumed in the majority's contrarian viewpoint. This, in turn,
helps us understand whether it is a manifestation of the Court's
journey towards moral consistency, or whether is it simply
tracing the moral contours in its adjudication of Constitutional
text.
As we bear witness to both a heightened awareness and
escalating controversy surrounding the death penalty, the corpus
of capital jurisprudence is replete with arguments and analysis
revolving around political, philosophical, racial, and social
dimensions.
In my view, however, the exploration of the
religious traditions and theological perspectives has not gone
beyond the hackneyed debate of "eye for an eye" 15 justice. It is,
15 The reference to the "eye for an eye" concept is being used here as a driver for
vengeance and retribution within the various fundamental religious values, as well
as governmental systems. These aspects are important to understand since many in
Christianity also support capital punishment. These aspects are described by
Pollock-Byrne:
Religious ethics have been used to support and to condemn capital
punishment. Old Testament law supporting the taking of an eye for an eye
is used by retentionists, while the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," is
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therefore, my objective in this essay to provide some unique
perspectives and significant reflective dimensions that highlight
less traveled roads of capital punishment. With an examination
of post-Furman American capital jurisprudence, through an in
depth understanding of the human person based on explicit
recognition for inherent human dignity, I wish to illuminate how
moral beliefs and institutionalized jurisprudence can shape the
concept of ultimate justice.
This is, especially within the
framework of a pluralistic democratic society, where the strict
used by the abolitionists .... It is a telling commentary that for as long as
society has used capital punishment to punish wrongdoing, critics have
defined it as immoral.
J.M. POLLOCK-BYRNE, ETHICS IN CRIME AND JUSTICE: DILEMMAS AND DECISIONS

140 (1989). Further outlined by authors Allen and Simonson is the historical
relevance of vengeance as noted:
The idea of vengeance is not new, nor is it unique in any fashion. Roughly
four thousand years ago the Hammurabi Code (1750 B.C.) prescribed
specific punishments for Babylonia. Examples include:
If a man knocks out the tooth of a man of his own rank, they shall
knock out his tooth.
If a son strikes his father, they shall cut off his fingers.
If a man destroys the eye of another man, they shall destroy his eye.
If a man of higher social rank destroys the eye of a man of lower rank,
the man shall pay a fine.
See H.E. ALLEN

&

CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 6 (1989).

Moving beyond the Babylonia example, there are historical codes designed with
vengeance and retribution in mind. For example, Modern American society was
more influenced by the Laws of Moses-the Old Testament rules of conduct and
penalties. These laws were specific and vengeful, recommending executions and
restitution, even for conduct that, today, may seem less than serious. See Exodus
20-22 (New American) (discussing penalties for various crimes); ALLEN &
SIMONSEN, supra. But, it is not necessary to rely only on history to witness this
retributive "eye for an eye" punishment. As a cursory scan of media archives will
provide the stark reminders of stoning, beheading, or cutting of appendages as
punishments ordered in such places as the Middle East. The retributive concept of
"eye for an eye" has imprinted its mark on many Christians, and the history of
retribution and vengeance within Christianity is unavoidable. This historical
doctrine has influenced the modern-day Church. I propose, more than the actual
dogma of the Church, but the individual Christian that reinterprets his or her
personal morals to coincide with modern law and to comport with the majority
opinion in vogue (i.e., pro-death penalty). But, this individual reinterpretation
causes a great disconnect between the faith of the individual and the actual teaching
of the Church. Additionally, the disconnect makes acceptance of the "eye for an eye"style punishment normal among the masses. This cycle is repeated over and over,
until it becomes internalized as a Christian belief within the widespread followers of
Christianity. This lends credence to the question, "Of the over 72 percent of the
population in favor of the death penalty in the United States, how many
simultaneously profess a Christian belief system?" S. WALKER, SENSE AND
NONSENSE ABOUT CRIME AND DRUGS (1989).
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boundaries between matters of private faith and political life are
not only encouraged but also often enforced. Therefore, this
article is segmented as follows:
Part I of my article examines the impact of Roper and Atkins
by tracing the trajectory of the Court from Furman and
examining what it means for the judiciary. Part II delves into
the evolutionary process of the Supreme Court's capital
punishment jurisprudence to understand whether a moral case
exists for an abolitionist future, while extracting the pitfalls and
road bumps the Court faced over the years. Part III investigates
whether the similarity between the Court's positions in Roper
and Atkins and Pope John Paul II's principled opposition to
capital punishment signals a normative alignment between the
two entities or a mere coincidence. In Part IV, I explore the longterm implications of Atkins and Roper, while tracing the
trajectory for an abolitionist future. By analyzing the full scope
of the moral persuasion presented with the Supreme Court's
legal discourse in Part V, I identify the challenges the Court
faces as it continues to provide moral leadership in establishing
the death penalty's doctrinal differences and uniqueness.
Finally, I conclude by summarizing my personal convictions and
a reflective dimension of these inquires.
I.

WHAT DID ATKINS AND ROPER MEAN FOR EIGHTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE?

In its path-breaking opinions of Atkins and Roper, the
Supreme Court has revitalized the death penalty debate, by
seeking to maximize human dignity through categorical
exemptions from capital punishment based on certain class of
individuals. Long before the landmark 2005 Roper decision,
however, we witnessed the introduction of "qualitative
difference" of death penalty jurisprudence in Furman v. Georgia,
where the Court took an expansive view of the Constitution's
Eighth Amendment protection of Due Process. 16 This qualitative
difference doctrine has survived and evolved within the
evolutionary process of the Supreme Court's capital

16 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286, 289 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("Death is a unique punishment .... Death ... is in a class by
itself."); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The penalty of death differs from all
other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind.").
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jurisprudence for its robust reasoning and timeless appeal on a
number of grounds. 17 The first line of reasoning focuses on
death's finality, which compels us to recognize that the
consequence of any procedural error is both irrecoverable and
immutable.' 8 Procedural errors can range from prosecutorial
17 In addition to Furman, the qualitative difference of the death penalty has
been established throughout the post-Furmanera. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion
holding it cruel and unusual to punish retarded persons with death is the "pinnacle
of... death-is-different jurisprudence"); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-06
(2002) (noting that "there is no doubt that death is different"); id. at 614 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment requires States to apply special procedural
safeguards when they seek the death penalty.") (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 153 (1976)); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 340 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("It hardly needs reiteration that this Court has consistently
acknowledged the uniqueness of the punishment of death."); Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412, 463 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referencing that the death
penalty is qualitatively different from other punishments) (citing Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984)); Spaziano, 468.U.S. at 459 (citing the Court's prior
recognition of the "'qualitative difference' of the death penalty"); id. at 468 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe death penalty is qualitatively
different ... and hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards."); Locket v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that the death penalty is "qualitatively
different") (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)); Gregg,
428 U.S. at 188 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (finding that the
"penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment" and emphasizing
its "uniqueness"); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.) ("[Tihe penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long.").
18 The finality and irreversibility of the death penalty is indoctrinated
throughout the post-Furman era capital jurisprudence in the Supreme Court. See
Ring, 536 U.S. at 616-17 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that DNA evidence
indicating that the convictions of numerous persons on death row are unreliable is
especially alarming since "death is not reversible"); Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 463
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (referencing irrevocability) (quoting Spaziano, 468 U.S. at
468)); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 460 n.7 (referencing irrevocability) (citing Gregg, 428
U.S. at 187)); id. at 468 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(referencing irrevocability); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.) (referencing irrevocability) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 286-291));
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)
(referencing finality); Furman, 408 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he
finality of death precludes relief."); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding death
"unique in its total irrevocability"). While giving primacy to procedural safeguards,
the Court has sought to reshape the scope of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause in several cases. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306
(holding it cruel and unusual to execute the mentally retarded because they do not
act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult
criminal conduct); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (finding it cruel
and unusual to pronounce death upon a defendant who was under sixteen at the
time of his crime); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-93 (1982) (finding it cruel
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misconduct to ineffective defense counsel, and from jury
manipulation to misleading instructions, all of which call for
additional procedural safeguards. 19 The second line of reasoning
relies on the implicit recognition that ultimate punishment on an
individual deprives that human being of his or her inherent
dignity. 20 Death's finality and the attendant legal discourse's
inability to fully encapsulate all the dimensions of its
immutability invites us to engage in a different kind of debateone that has not gained much currency, yet obtains legitimacy
from Justice Steven's dissent in Spaziano.21 In my view, the
death penalty doctrine must find a new trajectory which melds
within it an ethical vision, a vision that guarantees that the
and unusual to punish felony murder with death absent a showing that the
defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding it cruel and unusual to punish the crime of rape with
death).
19 See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 675-76 (2004) (discussing prosecutorial
misconduct); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537-38 (2003) (finding ineffective
assistance of counsel where counsel failed to investigate the accused's background
and to present mitigating evidence); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 347-48
(2003) (ordering new hearing for death row inmate who had presented substantial
prima facie evidence of unconstitutional race-based challenges to jurors in violation
of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S.
154, 156 (1994) (finding error by the trial court on the grounds of faulty jury
instruction by refusing to instruct the jury that, under state law, defendant would be
ineligible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment); Linda Greenhouse,
ProsecutorialMisconduct Leads Justices to Overturn Death Sentence in Texas, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A14 (discussing Supreme Court's decision to overturn death
sentence because prosecutors withheld evidence that would have made jurors less
likely to impose the death sentence.)
20 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing capital
punishment as the "ultimate sanction"); id. at 287 (describing the "uniqueness of
death" due to its "extreme severity"); id. (referring to death as an unusual
punishment in its "enormity"); id. at 290 (referring to death as a "truly... awesome
punishment"); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion) (describing death as
"unique in its severity" and an "extreme sanction"); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 460 n.7
(categorizing the uniqueness of the death sentence by its "severity"); id. at 468
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to the "severity" of
the death penalty as "qualitatively different from any other punishment");
Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to the severity of
the death penalty as its unique characteristic).
21 Professor Abramson believes: "In the words of Justice Stevens, the death
sentence 'is the one punishment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as judges
normally understand rules,' but is instead an ethical judgment expressing the
conscience of the community as to whether 'an individual has lost his moral
entitlement to live.'" Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the
Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 119 (2004) (quoting Spaziano,
468 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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forfeiture of life is not hostage to the legislative rule of law.
Accordingly, I seek to reexamine the moral contours of the
Constitutional framework from the days of Furman v. Georgia,
with a view to predict a future course for capital punishment
jurisprudence.
In the 1972 landmark Furman case, the Court sought to
establish moral consistency for the first time by invalidating
existing laws regarding the death penalty. The Court decided
that, on the grounds of the uniqueness of the death penalty, a
broader Eighth Amendment analysis was required.
Since
Furman, however, we witnessed a significant shift in the Court,
as emotion replaced deliberation via instruments such as victim
impact statements. 22 Along the way, the morality-irrelevant
retributive philosophy swept aside the Furman morality-based
human-dignity centric jurisprudence.
After a series of
deliberately unresolved, narrowly doctrinalized death penalty
decisions, the Court finally began to walk in stride with the
existing global social norms 23 in its Atkins decision.
Relying upon Trop v. Dulles,24 the Court in Atkins and Roper
held that the Eighth Amendment forbids some practices, such as
executing mentally retarded individuals or juveniles, on the
grounds that these practices are inconsistent with the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 25 In arguing for a categorical ban on imposing capital
punishment upon a particular class of offenders, the Court
promulgated that its "own judgment will be brought to bear on
the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment." 26 In establishing a category of exemption

22 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 817 (1991) (referencing the use of
victim impact statements).
23 See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468-70 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (discussing "current consensus of opinion"); see also Patrick E.
Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1047, 104849 (1991) (asserting that death penalty "decision[s] must occur past the point to

which legalistic reasoning can carry").
24 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
25 Id. at 101. There exist books and articles further discussing the historical
context of the addition of "evolving standards of decency" into the case opinions. See
ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 359 (1997) (describing the

standard); see also Charles Hobson, Atkins v. Virginia, Federalism, and Judicial
Review, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 23, 39-41 (2004) (discussing "evolving standards of
decency").
26 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536
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from capital punishment for the mentally retarded in Atkins, the
Court based its conclusion on the evolving national consensus
against such a practice; 27 this was a sharp departure from its
rejection of similar Eighth Amendment relief earlier. This
evolving national consensus, however, does not reflect a clear and
convincing majority of States that prohibit execution of the
mentally retarded. 28 Instead, this consensus incorporates the
Court's vision of implementing the "consistency of the direction of
30
change" 29 since Penry.
The Court's reasoning on the grounds of a national
consensus against execution was even weaker in Roper than in
Atkins. Despite the weakness of the argument in Roper, the
Court was emboldened to invalidate the findings of Stanford v.
Kentucky,3 1 and articulated a newer national consensus standard
based on the same "consistency of the direction of change" that
has been demonstrated. 32 The Roper Court recognized significant
differences between youth and adult offenders. Among other
things, the Court acknowledged that young people exhibit less
maturity of judgment, are more vulnerable to peer pressure, and
tend to have an undeveloped sense of responsibility.3 3 This
reasoning raises a host of pertinent and significant issues. Can
the rationale in Atkins be extended for mentally ill capital
murderers by taking them off death row? Will the opinion in
Roper be the groundwork to categorically ban executions for
other classes of criminal capital defendants? This article will
explore the answer while dissecting the obstacles the Supreme
Court must overcome if it truly wants to make significant
adjustments to capital jurisprudence of the land.
The Court's invalidation of its earlier holdings in Penry and
Stanford established new standards of national consensus
against the death penalty.
The Court's earlier holding in

U.S. 304, 312 (2002)).
27

See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16.

See id. (stating that thirty-three states prohibited capital punishment for the
mentally retarded, which included fourteen states that have completely rejected
capital punishment, and seventeen states that preclude capital punishment for the
mentally retarded).
29 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
30 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
31 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
32 Roper, 543 U.S. at 566 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315).
33 See id. at 569.
28
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Stanford searched for a national consensus as an enforcing
mechanism. With the Court's newer decision, the framework of
Stanford was not invalidated but the measuring standard was
relaxed in favor of a more expansive analysis of the Eighth
Amendment, which now must qualify for just a "significant
This broadened scope of Eighth Amendment
trend. '34
jurisprudence came in against the domestic tide of a strong
retributive impulse. This is especially true when the Court
dictates, "in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on
the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the
The historical practice becomes
Eighth Amendment." 35
subordinate to the Court's own moral preference, and the
national consensus analysis becomes a defacto vehicle for the
Court's moral contour. Further evidence of the Atkins court's
independence is evidenced from the description of the Court's
own framework: "[B]y our approach in these cases, we shall first
review the judgment of legislatures that have addressed the
suitability of imposing the death penalty on the mentally
retarded and then consider reasons for agreeing or disagreeing
with their judgment."36 This constitutionalization of the Eighth
Amendment is either contentious, as some commentators
characterized it as a "jurisprudential train wreck," or simply
moral philosophizing. 37 This article argues that within this
current evolution of the Supreme Court's capital jurisprudence
lies the seeds of a larger system of morality that is, perhaps, best
understood through the Papal doctrine of John Paul II.
Neither are the moral contours traversed by the Justices in
Roper and Atkins unique, nor is the exploration of a humanityladen legal discourse unprecedented. The history of the U.S.
Supreme Court's modern jurisprudence on the constitutionality
of the death penalty has been punctuated by cases where the
moral discourse was heavily impregnated within the legal
discourse. 38 Relentless dissent by Justices against the death
34 See id. at 566.
35 See id. at 563;

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,

823 n.8 (1988).
36

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.

37

See Benjamin Wittes, What is "Cruel and Unusual'7, 134 POL'Y REV. 15, 15

(2005).

38 The Supreme Court's legal landscape since McGautha v. California has
changed course as death-is-different-jurisprudence is advanced through moral and
constitutional debates about capital punishment. See McGautha v. California, 402
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penalty not only brings to focus the moral overtones of
penological practice, but also begs the question, whose morality is
39
being upheld as we continue to impose the death penalty?
U.S. 183 (1971). From the beginning, the Supreme Court recognized capital
punishment as lawful, as it asserted, "[tihe Constitution itself poses the first
obstacle to [the] argument that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional."
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 418 (1972) (per curiam) (Powell, J. dissenting).
The Fifth Amendment, adopted in 1791, refers in specific terms to capital
punishment and, thus, implicitly recognizes its validity. The Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted in 1868, while obligating the States not to deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law, implicitly recognizes the
right of States to make laws for such purposes. Id. at 285 (discussing the Fourteenth
Amendment and noting that, in the past, the Court has presumed death to be a
constitutional punishment). Constitutional challenges to capital punishments are
based on the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.
Despite the fact that the Eighth Amendment "has not been regarded as a static
concept," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1996) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.), and it draws its meaning "from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society," Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), the
very fact that the Constitution recognizes the lawfulness of capital punishment has
proven to be an obstacle to fully accepting this argument. As a result, post-Furman
judgments increasingly contained arguments where we witnessed moral discourse
impregnating legal analysis. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 283-287. (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (referring to human dignity); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 887 (Cal.
1972) (considering the importance of the lives of the criminals sentenced to death),
superseded by statute, CA CONST. art. 1, § 28(d). In this context, Professor Perry
notes: "The penetration of legal discourse by moral discourse is not surprising. Moral
controversy is often at the center of legal controversy; in particular, controversy
about whether one or another practice (abortion, homosexual sexual conduct,
physician-assisted suicide, etc.) is, at least in some instances ...legally
permissible." See Michael J. Perry, What Is "Morality"Anyway? 3 (Villanova Univ.
Sch. Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2000-03,
2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=208673.
39 While tracing the genesis of death penalty jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court, I examine in this article the views taken by several Justices in some of the
significant post-Furman era cases, in which their opinions, either in concurrence or
in dissent, have significantly shaped the moral contours of the Court. In my view,
sustained dissent by two Justices-Brennan and Marshall-in capital penalty cases,
produced a rich body of legal literature where the issues of morality and ethics have
shaken the very core of the doctrine of stare decisis. These Justices' relentless
unwillingness to accommodate the views of the majority signals a clarion call to
change the law in a certain direction within the capital penalty jurisprudence. In a
direct confrontation to Justice Brandeis' timeless observation, "[i]t is usually more
important that a rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." Di Santo v.
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), the continued
dissents by Justices in cases upholding the death penalty perhaps signals that the
law of capital punishment is far from being settled. I would argue that this abiding
conviction to settle the law correctly drove Justices to dissent in landmark cases. See
generally William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTING L.J., 427
(1986) (discussing the relevance of dissenting opinions). I will show in this article
that Justices Brennan and Marshall have repeatedly questioned the morality of the
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These are some of the most profound and controversial questions
that will continue to buffet society's collective consciences, and
the answers can never satisfy all constituents. This article,
however, will not seek absolute answers. Rather, these questions
will be positioned within a relevant framework. 40 In order to
provide such a framework for the relevancy of moral arguments
in Roper and Atkins, I will attempt to sketch the historical
evolution of moral contours and its attendant humanity in
41
selected Supreme Court cases.

II. THE ROAD TO ROPER: AN ABOLITIONIST OUTCOME OR
BUILDING A MORAL CONTOUR?
The Court's confrontation with the issue of moral
vulnerability in its deliberation on the constitutionality of the
death penalty dates back to McGautha v. California,42 decided in
1971. 43 Although the debate over the constitutionality of the
death penalty brewed for over a decade prior to the McGautha
ruling, the Court, for the first time, embarked on a significant
moral discourse on the issue.
In McGautha, the Court
deconstructed defendant McGautha's reasoning that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause called for the
standardization in capital sentence discretion and that the lack
of standards in narrow jury instructions, as a result, caused a
breakdown in the protection provided by the Fourteenth

death penalty in their dissents, which leads us to explore the larger question as to
whose morality is being upheld in those majority decisions.
40 The death penalty gets complicated while viewing it through the prism of
morality. In any morality-laden discourse, the inevitable issue before the scholars is

to answer the focused question of whose morality the legal discourse should
doctrinalize. See Perry, supra note 38, at 3-4 (explaining that the sword of moral
discourse can cut both ways into a legal doctrine's development, as opposing sides
lobby for either banning or upholding the relevant law in question). This article,
therefore, attempts to navigate this issue by first tracing a moral contour involving
death penalty and then proposing a robust framework supporting the abolitionist
viewpoint that can transcend narrow doctrinal considerations.
41 See infra Part II (discussing the moral contours of the "evolving standards of
decency"). Here I refer to a select number of Supreme Court cases that have been
path-breaking in establishing a moral discourse within the Supreme Court's death
penalty jurisprudence.
42 402 U.S. 183 (1971), superseded on other grounds by statute, Fed. R. Evid.
609(a), as recognized in United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 173 n.11 (1977).
43 See id. at 207-08 (noting the problems with creating "standards" for the
death penalty and discussing the great responsibility of jurors in death penalty
cases).
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Amendment. 44
Though the majority rejected this line of
argument, the McGautha decision stands significant in the
evolution of capital jurisprudence for a number of reasons. First
and foremost, perhaps for the first time, the Court confronted
moral vulnerability in the death penalty jurisprudence as it
engages in a rational discourse. Justice Harlan noted:
In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of
human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that
committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power
to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to
anything in the Constitution. The States are entitled to assume
that jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of
decreeing death for a fellow human will act with due regard for
the consequences of their decision and will consider a variety of
factors, many of which will have been suggested by the evidence
or by the arguments of defense counsel. For a court to attempt
to catalog the appropriate factors in this elusive area could
inhibit rather than expand the scope of consideration, for no list
of circumstances would ever be really complete. The infinite
variety of cases and facets to each case would make general
standards either meaningless "boiler-plate" or a statement of
45
the obvious that no jury would need.

The Court consolidated the McGautha decision with a
petition from an Ohio defendant by the name of Crampton. 46
Though McGautha raised fundamental constitutional issues
regarding the death penalty, 47 we cannot shy away from also
See id. at 196.
Id. at 207-08.
46 Id. at 185. The McGautha Court relayed the details of the crime for which the
jury found Crampton guilty and sentenced him to death. Id. at 191-95.
47 See id. at 185 ("We granted certiorari in the McGautha case limited to the
question whether petitioner's constitutional rights were infringed by permitting the
jury to impose the death penalty without any governing standards."). I will argue
that McGautha raised a host of constitutional as well as moral issues that mostly
remain unresolved today. First, in McGautha, the petitioners challenged the
constitutionality of the death penalty on account of the Due Process violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment: Petitioners asked a focused question on whether the jury
can impose death penalty while deliberating outside the guiding standards. See
supra text accompanying note 43. Even though the Court upheld McGautha's death
sentence, the majority opinion reflected the apparent discomfort by Justice Harlan
in upholding the sentence on constitutional grounds, as he noted:
To fit their arguments within a constitutional frame of reference petitioners
contend that to leave the jury completely at large to impose or withhold the
death penalty as it sees fit is fundamentally lawless and therefore violates
the basic command of the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall not
44
45
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reviewing the moral issues that emerged. 48 McGautha and
Crampton based their respective challenges on the claim that
constitutional Due Process was violated because there was no
clear explication within the law that clearly ascertained where
and who received the death penalty. Although the Court rejected
this Due Process claim, even while still conceding that there was
an apparent lack of standards to guide juries in their decision,
they never completely dismissed the issue of inconsistency in the
imposition of the death penalty. 49 Justice Harlan further
reinforced this viewpoint in his citation of the tentative draft of
the Model Penal Code in which he admitted that sentencing
guidelines are neither possible nor constitutionally required:
"[T]he factors which determine whether the sentence of death is

deprive a person of his life without due process of law.
McGautha, 402 U.S. at 196.
Second, in McGautha, defendant Crampton challenged the constitutionality of
Ohio's single unitary proceeding on the grounds that the defendant was unable to
offer testimony on his own behalf on account of his exposure to prosecutorial crossexamination. See id. at 213 ("[T]he single-verdict procedure unlawfully compels the
defendant to become a witness against himself on the issue of guilt by the threat of
sentencing him to death without having heard from him."). In his dissent, Justice
Douglas conceded this point very eloquently:
If a defendant wishes to testify in support of the defense of insanity or in
mitigation of what he is charged with doing, he can do so only if he
surrenders his right to be free from self-incrimination. Once he takes the
stand he can be cross-examined not only as respects the crime charged but
also on other misdeeds. In Ohio impeachment covers a wide range of
subjects: prior convictions for felonies and statutory misdemeanors,
pending indictments, prior convictions in military service, and dishonorable
discharges. Once he testifies he can be recalled for cross-examination in the
State's case in rebuttal.
Id. at 228 (Douglas, J., dissenting). As indicated in note 42, supra, after the
enactment of rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Justice Douglas'
recitation of the relevant law is no longer accurate. This, however, does not alter the
nature of the issues as raised by the parties in McGautha.
Additionally, for a general understanding of pre-Furman litigation strategy
against the death penalty, see MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973).
48 Having established my rational for tracing the moral contours of the Supreme
Court's death penalty jurisprudence in the introduction to this paper, supra, and
also in note 39, supra,I attempt to extract the implicit concession of Justice Harlan,
and the dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall, to show the moral discourse
attendant with the McGautha decision.
49 See supra text accompanying notes 44 and 45 (failing to directly address the
possibility of inconsistent sentences resulting from the jury's "untrammeled
discretion" in sentencing criminals to death).
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the appropriate penalty in particular cases are too complex to be
50
compressed within the limits of a simple formula."
True moral discourse is possible when the legal process
acknowledges its vulnerability and weakness. This is a required
step to correct any flaws within the constitutional adjudication
process; therefore, it is explored in the next path-breaking
Supreme Court case of Furman v. Georgia.51 McGautha should
be remembered not only for its attempt to trace the moral
contours of the judicial process, but also for its embrace of human
fallibility, a necessary stepping stone to comprehend the inherent
dignity of the human person. This is made evident by Justice
Harlan as he exposed his soul in McGautha and grappled with
the inevitability of human limitations: "To identify before the
fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their
perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express
these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood
and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks
which are beyond present human ability. 52
If Justice Harlan's majority opinion skimmed the surface of a
morality-laden reasoning on constitutionality adjudication of
capital punishment, Justice Douglas' scathing dissent from the
majority, for using history as a guide, called for a critical moral
evaluation, as he noted:
The Court has history on its side-but history alone. Though
nations have been killing men for centuries, felony crimes
increase. The vestiges of law enshrined today have roots in
barbaric procedures. Barbaric procedures such as ordeal by
battle that became imbedded in the law were difficult to
dislodge. Though torture was used to exact confessions, felonies
mounted. Once it was thought that "sanity" was determined by
ascertaining whether a person knew the difference between
"right" and "wrong." Once it was a capital offense to steal from
53
the person something "above the value of a shilling.
The appeal of McGautha is more pronounced in Justice
Douglas' dissent than it is in the majority opinion penned by
Justice Harlan. While Justice Douglas' dissent signaled a need

50 McGautha, 402 U.S. at 205 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. 3
(Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)).
51 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
52 McGautha, 402 U.S. at 204.
53 Id. at 241 (citations omitted).
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for an evolutionary trend in capital jurisprudence, Justice
Harlan's opinion denied the petitioners' claims while conceding
the absence of detailed standards in capital punishment and the
54
lack of explicit protections to all parties subject to State control.
McGautha is also significant because both dissents indicated the
55
future events to unfold, as we shall see in Furman.
The decision in Furman was one of the watershed moments
of American Supreme Court jurisprudence on death penalty for
multiple reasons. First, in a 5-4 vote, the Court found that
sentencing defendants under the death penalty statutes under
review was cruel and unusual punishment, and unconstitutional,
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 56
Second, with 232 pages, it is not only the longest Supreme Court
decision on the death penalty, but also consisted of nine separate
opinions.5 7 Third, by virtue of these separate opinions, the
decision encapsulated a wide range of complex and indeterminate
issues. 58 Justices Douglas, Marshall, Brennan, Stewart, and
See id. at 207.
5 McGautha and Furman are forever linked in the storied history of the U.S.
Supreme Court's capital jurisprudence for various reasons. McGautha's implicit
findings pointing to the impossibility of the formulation of death sentencing
standards, when pitted against Furman's direct assault on the constitutionality of
the death penalty on the grounds of chaotic sentencing discretion, triggered an
avalanche of redrafting by states to reinstate the death penalty; Florida was the first
state in line to try to respond to Furman's challenge. See generally Charles W.
Ehrhardt & L. Harold Levinson, The Aftermath of Furman: The FloridaExperience
(pt. II), 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1973) (discussing Florida's response to
Furman); Tim Thornton, Note, Florida's Legislative and Judicial Responses to
Furman v. Georgia: An Analysis and Criticism, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 108 (1974)
(discussing Florida's response to Furman).Many states followed Florida in passing a
statute that standardized guided discretion by specifying both aggravating and
mitigating factors that must be taken into consideration in imposing the death
penalty. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (indicating that some
thirty-five states enacted similar statutes). Several of the dissenting opinions in
Furman reflected the tension between McGautha and Furman, an issue further
explored by various legal scholars. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 399-400 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (expressing disappointment in the Court's differing outcomes); id. at 427
(Powell, J., dissenting) (pointing out the differing outcomes in the two cases); see also
Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 2-4 (1972) (discussing Furmanand McGautha); Ernest A. Rende, Note,
The Bitter Fruit of McGautha- Eddings v. Oklahoma and the Need for Weighing
Method Articulation in Capital Sentencing, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 63, 65-67 (1982).
56 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
57 See id. at 240. See Polsby, supra note 55, for a general analysis of the
opinions in Furman.
54

58 See MICHAEL A. FOLEY, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS: THE SUPREME COURT,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE DEATH PENALTY 62-87 (2003) (referencing and
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White voted with the majority, while Justices Powell, Blackmun,
Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger dissented. 59 Subsequently,
however, two of the dissenters, Powell and Blackmun, announced
their unequivocal opposition to the death penalty. 60 The Furman
illustrating the complexity of the issues permeating the death penalty debate); see
generally MELTSNER, supra note 47 (describing the Supreme Court's history
regarding capital punishment).
59 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 240.
60 While the abolitionist position of Justices Brennan and Marshall centered
within the context of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause's apparent lack of
consonance with the overriding principle of human dignity, see, e.g., Furman, 408
U.S. at 270-71 (Brennan, J., concurring), Justices Harry Blackmun and Lewis
Powell Jr. joined the abolitionist camp years later. Blackmun joined later in his
career while Powell joined after his retirement. After two decades of debating the
unconstitutionality of the death penalty with his jurisprudential self-justification,
and while grappling with the efficacies of capital punishment's fail-safe mechanism,
Blackmun finally succumbed to his disillusion to the death penalty as he articulated
in his dissent:
Perhaps one day this Court will develop procedural rules or verbal
formulas that actually will provide consistency, fairness, and reliability in a
capital sentencing scheme. I am not optimistic that such a day will come. I
am more optimistic, though, that this Court eventually will conclude that
the effort to eliminate arbitrariness while preserving fairness "in the
infliction of [death] is so plainly doomed to failure that it-and the death
penalty-must be abandoned altogether." I may not live to see that day, but
I have faith that eventually it will arrive. The path the Court has chosen
lessens us all.
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1159 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). Although it took over twenty-three years for Justice Blackmun to grapple
with the inner conflicts between morality and constitutionality, the seeds of an
abolitionist viewpoint were sewn as far back as can be witnessed in his principled
opposition to capital punishment-a sentiment articulated in his dissent in Furman,
in which he stated:
Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit. I
yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed,
abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress
and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite minds. That distaste is
buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no useful purpose
that can be demonstrated. For me, it violates childhood's training and life's
experiences, and is not compatible with the philosophical convictions I have
been able to develop. It is antagonistic to any sense of "reverence for life."
Furman, 408 U.S. at 405-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Needless to say, Justice
Blackmun has dissented from the imposition of the death penalty in every capital
punishment case since February 22, 1994, the day of his dramatic dissent in Callins.
Justice Powell's journey towards an abolitionist position, on the contrary, began
after his retirement from the Court. According to his biographer, after his
retirement Justice Powell began to endorse the abolitionist position. In 1991, the
following is ascribed to then-retired Justice Lewis Powell as told to his biographer, "I
have come to think that capital punishment should be abolished." It "serves no
useful purpose." JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451-52
(1994). Such strong conviction by Justice Powell is indeed the culmination of a long
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decision is significant not only because of complex constitutional
issues explicated therein, but more so due to the Justices'
willingness to embed morality-laden argumentation within
contemporary legal discourse. Furman sets itself apart by the
manner in which all five Justices in the majority arrived at the
conclusion to ban capital punishment via different routes. While
Justice Brennan saw the death penalty as an anathema to
human dignity, Justice Marshall argued against it based on a
morally unacceptable path for achieving penological objectives.
The three other Justices in the majority, however, shied away
from either engaging in any moral discourse or digression on
humanity; rather they saw death penalty to be unnecessarily
harsh and constitutionally illegitimate because of its arbitrary
and capricious application.
Echoing the concerns of the
petitioners in McGautha and Crampton,6 1 Justice Douglas noted
that standardized discretion in sentencing jurors would lead to
race and class bias. 62 Justice White followed suit, observing that
journey through his Supreme Court jurisprudence. His justidical philosophy on the
bench is highlighted by his extreme reverence to the constitutionality of the death
penalty as well as judicial restraint, as echoed in his dissent in Furman: "When
asked to encroach on the legislative prerogative we are well counseled to proceed
with the utmost reticence." Furman,408 U.S. at 431 (Powell, J., dissenting).
61 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 183 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(including a petition from Crampton, an Ohio defendant), superseded by statute,
FED. R. EVID. 609(a). Decided on May 3, 1971, this case finds its importance in the
history of Supreme Court jurisprudence as the precursor to the path-breaking
Furman decision. In this context, the dissenting opinions by Justices Douglas and
Brennan were noteworthy as the trailblazers to the majority's opinion invalidating
the death penalty in Furman.
62 In
his majority opinion in Furman, Justice Douglas held that the death
penalty is unconstitutional on grounds of violating the Cruel and Unusual
punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Furman,408 U.S. at 239-40. His
concern was that the selective and discriminatory application of the death penalty
was inconsistent with the constitutional objective of achieving fundamental legal
equality among the citizens. Therefore, he argued that any deviation from the
application of law that fosters inequality was unconstitutional, as he asserted, "[ilt
would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is
'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social
position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of
such prejudices." Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring). Throughout the length of his
Furman opinion, Justice Douglas was highly dismissive of the death penalty, while
establishing his position on constitutionality squarely on the indeterminate and
haphazard application, as he concluded: "Thus, these discretionary statutes are
unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and
discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of
the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments." Id. at 25657. In this context, we must note the genesis of Justice Douglas' principled
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death sentences were so rarely imposed that they lacked any
retributive or deterrent objectives. 63 Focusing less on lack of
standardization, or not so much on the penological goals, Justice
Stewart's opinion perhaps will forever be remembered for its
opposition to capital punishment. What we see as an eloquent repudiation of the
death penalty on constitutional grounds is an extension of his stinging dissent to the
upholding of the death sentence in McGautha. See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 241-42
(Douglas, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Douglas examined the procedural
defects of the Ohio trial procedure where the determination of guilt, punishment,
and sanity phases were packed in one. This unitary trial proceeding, according to
Douglas, "does not satisfy the requirements of procedural Due Process under the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 226. His dismissal of the majority's upholding of the
death sentences in McGautha comes from his observation that the unitary trial
proceedings are fundamentally biased to return the punishment of death in
reasonable circumstances, as he noted:
[T]he rules governing and restricting its administration of the unitary trial
system, place the weights on the side of man's sadistic drive. The exclusion
of evidence relevant to the issue of "mercy" is conspicuous proof of that
lopsided procedure; and the hazards to an accused resulting from mingling
the issues of guilt, insanity, and punishment in one unitary proceeding are
multiplied. Whether this procedure would satisfy due process when dealing
with lesser offenses may be debated. But with all deference I see no
grounds for debate where the stake is life itself.
Id. at 248.
63 In almost every aspect, Furman's individual decisions represent the Justices'
evolution towards a greater understanding of the death penalty's inherent,
structural deficiencies. Justice White's concurrence is of no exception as he pondered
over the question whether the death sentence is a cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment in the ordinary meaning of these words, or whether it is a cruel,
inhuman, or degrading punishment within the meaning of the Constitution. It,
therefore, comes as no surprise when Justice White said in Furman:"The imposition
and execution of the death penalty are obviously cruel in the dictionary sense."
Furman, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring). Ironically, however, the very same
Justice was one of the Justices who held, in Gregg v. Georgia, that capital
punishment was not per se cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (White, J., concurring). In light of his reversal in
Gregg, therefore, we must focus on White's concern about the constitutionality of the
death penalty centering on the widely held social objectives of retribution and
deterrence. With regards to the retributive effects of the death penalty, Justice
White points out the infrequency with which the punishment is carried out, thereby
making any legitimate claims of retribution absurd. Therefore, he concluded, "there
is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from
the many cases in which it is not." Furman,408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
On the other hand, Justice White accepted, on face value, the utilitarian ideals of
the death penalty's deterrent effects on society, but he was skeptical about its
explicit utilitarian impact, as he noted that deterrence, like retribution, is
undermined by the infrequency with which the death penalty is imposed. "[The
deterrence of] others by punishing the convicted criminal ...would not be
substantially served where the penalty is so seldom invoked that it ceases to be the
credible threat essential to influence the conduct of others." Id. at 311-12.
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timeless wisdom as he emphasized the random nature of capital
sentences while noting:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all
the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968,
many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among
a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence
of death has in fact been imposed. My concurring Brothers have
demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the
selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the
constitutionally impermissible basis of race.
But racial
discrimination has not been proved, and I put it to one side. I
simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and
64
so freakishly imposed.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion proceeded in multiple
layers, as he developed his reasoning for an unqualified and
unequivocal abolitionist position. 65 First, he detoured from his
McGautha position, a trajectory he never abandoned. 66 Second,
he traced the roots of the Framers' deliberation on formulating

Furman,408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Furman developed the first
comprehensive test to determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual within
the meaning of Constitution's Eighth Amendment. The first principle dictates that
the punishment should not be so severe that it degrades human dignity by inflicting
enormous mental or physical pain, such that the human subject is treated as an
inanimate object to be discarded at will. The second principle prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty in an arbitrary fashion. The third principle dictates
that infliction of a severe punishment must comport with the norms of contemporary
society, whether the legislative bindings of such punishment can be superseded by
the evolving standards of civilization. The fourth, and final, principle is that the
punishment cannot be determined as excessive in proportion to the social purpose of
the punishment. See id. at 269-82 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing the
principles underlying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and noting that,
"[a]t bottom [the clause] prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and in-human
punishments").
66 In McGautha, Justice Brennan called for protective measures against the
imposition of the death penalty in an arbitrary and haphazard manner, as he noted:
"I see no reason whatsoever to believe that the nature of capital sentencing is such
that it cannot be surrounded with the protections ordinarily available to check
arbitrary and lawless action." McGautha, 402 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Furman,Justice Brennan concluded that the death penalty is unconstitutional in
violation of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause-a
position of principled opposition to capital punishment he never relinquished.
Furman,408 U.S. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring).
64
65
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the Cruel and Unusual Clause and he showed that this
particular clause was introduced specifically for the purpose of
restraining the legislation from exercising unbridled power to
impose punishments of their choice. 67 Third, the structural
complexity and constitutional difficulty attendant in the death
penalty puts the Court in a unique position to inject new life into
the meaning of the death penalty and the scope of constitutional
deliberation. 68 For the explicit purpose of my present discourse,

67 In Furman, Justice Brennan spoke at length of the historical events
preceding the Framers' drafting of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,
showing historical events as evidence towards his hypothesis that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause was inserted "precisely because the legislature would
otherwise have had the unfettered power to prescribe punishments for crimes."
Furman, 408 U.S. at 263 (Brennan, J., concurring).
68 Here, we are confronted with the issue of stare decisis versus constitutional
interpretation. Brennan argued for limited judicial activism for constitutional
interpretation as the need to expand the constitutional clause emerges due to
changing values and complex sociological dimensions. I will argue later on in the
paper that the uniqueness of the death penalty makes it incumbent upon all of us to
extricate ourselves from the frozen, static-in-time version of the Constitution, to
embrace a more dynamic Constitution. By referring to a dynamic Constitution,
attention is drawn to the process by which the Constitution adapts to the changing
conditions in the society. As the frontiers of freedom of speech, freedom of religion,
the rights to privacy, and sexual practices among consenting adults continue to
expand within the meaning of our Constitution, we are confronted with its dynamic
aspect. In most parlances, the dynamic Constitution and the living Constitution are
used synonymously. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN

INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

1-2,

12-13,

269 (2004)

(describing the role that social, cultural, and political processes have played in
constitutional law). The term living is used to denote that the Constitution is still
evolving in consonance with the evolving needs of society, rather than possessing a
fixed in time, definitive meaning. The concept of a living Constitution was noted by
the Court in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958), when the majority noted
that "the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and ... their scope is
not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." The concept further gained
currency in a 1987 lecture by Justice Thurgood Marshall titled, The Constitution:A
Living Document, where he argued that the Constitution must be interpreted in
light of the moral, political, and cultural climate of the age of interpretation. See
Thurgood Marshall, Remarks at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent
and Trademark Law Association In Maui, Hawaii (May 6, 1987) (indicating that the
Constitution is a concept vastly different from that the Framers began to construct
two centuries ago), available at http://www.thurgoodmarshall.com/speeches/
constituional speech.htm; see also Dr. Saby Ghoshray, To Understand Foreign Court
Citation: Dissecting Originalism, Dynamism, Romanticism, and Consequentialism,
69 ALB. L. REV. 3, 709-43; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of
[Human] Kind: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional
Adjudication, AM.
SOC'Y
INTL
L.,
Apr.
1, 2005,
http://www.asil.
org/events/AM05/ginsburg05O4Ol.html (discussing the importance of developments
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however, I want to focus more on the next layer of reasoning in
Justice Brennan's opinion, which formed the backbone of his
argumentation, as he proposed a benchmark for Cruel and
69
Unusual punishment.
For Brennan, the preservation of human dignity lies at the
very core of our human existence and thus must shape the
constitutional framework of liberty. As a consequence, Justice
Brennan draws the meaning and scope of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause from the Court's findings in Trop v. Dulles,70
as it held: "The Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." 71 Although it was not a death penalty case,
this single phrase in Trop has become an enduring guiding
principle in the Supreme
Court's capital punishment
jurisprudence. 72 Under this principle, according to Brennan, an
in international law and their affect on American Constitutional Law).
69 Here, I refer to Justice Brennan's natural law based jurisprudence which was
exhibited in his reliance on moral discourse and giving primacy to human dignity,
while departing from the original meaning of the Constitutional text in his
adjudication of the constitutionality of the death penalty. Since Brennan focused
more on such fundamental values as the innate characteristics of human nature or
essential human rights, he was freed from the constraints of history, which in turn
allowed him to develop a steadfast abolitionist stance against the death penalty that
stood the test of time against all forms of sociological jurisprudence, while insisting
that the meaning of the "cruel and unusual" punishment must comport with the
overriding principle of human dignity in Furman. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 257, 285
(Brennan, J., concurring) (referring to the importance of human dignity). Justice
Brennan noted elsewhere, "[t]he constant for Americans, for our ancestors, for
ourselves, and we hope for future generations, is our commitment to the
constitutional ideal of libertarian dignity protected through the law." William J.
Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall: Advocate for Human Need in American
Jurisprudence,40 MD. L. REV. 390, 394-95 (1981). For a discussion of Brennan's
natural law philosophy, see C.M.A. McCauliff, Constitutional Jurisprudence of
History and Natural Law: Complementary or Rival Modes of Discourse?, 24 CAL. W.
L. REV. 287, 289-91 (1988).
70 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
71 Id. at 101.
72 The phrase "evolving standards of decency" is taken from the opinion of the
Chief Justice Warren in Trop where, speaking for the Court, the Chief developed the
measure of permissible punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution by referencing "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." Id. Since then, various Justices have used this as
the guiding principle for deciding claims of Cruel and Unusual Punishment.
Sometimes "evolving standards of decency" has been used synonymously with
"contemporary standards of decency." For example, in People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d
880 (Cal. 1972), superseded by statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (Deering 1985),
Chief Justice Wright, speaking for the Supreme Court of California, said: "Public
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enlightened society must move forward in its penological
practices the same way the maturing society moves ahead in
cultural, social, and economical practices. 73
Therefore, the
"evolving standards of decency" 74 threshold makes it incumbent
on a maturing society to undergo strict moral human scrutiny.
The confrontation with evolving standards of morality allowed
for the abolishment of slavery and the elimination of torture as
punishment as Western civilization marched towards maturity.
The issue we must confront, therefore, is when society, as it has
done in the past with slavery and torture, will be able to leave
behind yet another draconian practice of yesteryears and
extricate itself from tinkering with the machinery of death 75 as a
form of punishment? Justice Brennan tackled this issue head on
in his concurrence in Furman, as he searched for the guiding
principle in overturning a practice spanning centuries:
At bottom, then, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and in-human
punishments. The State, even as it punishes, must treat its
members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human
beings. A punishment is "cruel and unusual," therefore, if it
76
does not comport with human dignity.

Legal discourse centering on human dignity forms the very
core of Justice Brennan's jurisprudential philosophy, which
shaped his perpetual opposition to the death penalty as he sees

acceptance of capital punishment is a relevant but not controlling factor in assessing
whether it is consonant with contemporary standards of decency." Id. at 893. In this
context, Justice Scalia's comment in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), is
noteworthy: "Of course, the risk of assessing evolving standards is that it is all too
easy to believe that evolution has culminated in one's own views." Id. at 865 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
73 Here, Justice Brennan beckons us to move away from the practice of the
death penalty-a point on which Justice Brennan and I completely agree. There is
ample objective evidence that evolving standards of civilization manifest in the
rejection of the death penalty in countries that are, or aspire to be, free and
democratic societies. Most democratic countries in this regard have either abolished
the death penalty, or are heading towards a practice of non-existent usage without
deleting it from the Constitution. For Justice Brennan's relevant ideology, see
Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring), where he opined that the death
penalty is excessive and unnecessary if there exists any less intrusive means by
which to achieve punishment's goals.
74 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
75 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.").
76 Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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the denial of human dignity not to be in conformity with the
concept of a maturing society. 77 According to Brennan, therefore,
a punishment such as the death penalty must be
unconstitutional on account of being cruel and unusual in all
circumstances, as he noted:
A punishment must not be so severe as to be utterly and
irreversibly degrading to the very essence of human dignity.
Death for any crime whatsoever, and under all circumstances, is
a truly awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a
human being by the state involves, by its very nature, an
absolute denial of the executed person's humanity. The most
vile murder does not, in my view, release the state from
constitutional restraints on the destruction of human dignity.
Yet an executed person has lost the very right to have rights,
now or ever. For me, then, the fatal constitutional infirmity of
race
capital punishment is that it treats members of the human
78
as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded.
Brennan's problem with the death penalty, therefore, comes
from the fundamental disconnect between the severity of death
as a punishment and the denial of intrinsic human dignity.
Brennan finds that the denial of basic human dignity or intrinsic
humanity to all persons does not comport with the evolution of
contemporary society, as he noted in Furman:
The question, then, is whether the deliberate infliction of death
is today consistent with the command of the Clause that the
State may not inflict punishments that do not comport with
human dignity. I will analyze the punishment of death in terms

77 See id. at 279 (noting that punishment cannot comport with human dignity
when it is unnecessary and excessive). I would contend that Justice Brennan's
concept of the prevailing characteristics of a maturing society is fully consistent with
the views espoused by some other Justices who came before Brennan. This valuedriven, morality-laced understanding of the constitutional framework is implicit in
Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), where he makes the role of the state very clear: "Our
Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example." A similar sentiment is echoed by Justice Schaefer of
the Supreme Court of Illinois: "The methods we employ in the enforcement of our
criminal law have aptly been called the measures by which the quality of our
civilization may be judged." Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962)
(citing Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 26 (1956)).
78 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 444 (1986).
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of the principles set out above and the cumulative test to which
they lead: It is a denial of human dignity for the State
arbitrarily to subject a person to an unusually severe
punishment that society has indicated it does not regard as
acceptable, and that cannot be shown to serve any penal
purpose more effectively than a significantly less drastic
79
punishment.

The goal of this paper has not been to explicate the
procedures by which we determine when a punishment does not
comport with Brennan's "human dignity" test.8 0 Nor is it
intended to digress on his cumulative tests to determine cruel
and unusual punishment.8 l It is intended to capture Justice
Brennan's human dignity-centric jurisprudence 2 that requires
building a moral contour around the evolution of the Court's
capital jurisprudence-a task impossible to complete without
delving into Justice Marshall's morality-laden legal discourse in
8 3

Furman.

In Furman, Justice Marshall presented a lengthy opinion
that examined the efficacy of the death penalty under the

79 Furman, 408 U.S. at 285-86 (Brennan, J., concurring).
30 Here, I refer to Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman,asserting that any
remaining "cruel and unusual" punishment must comport with the overriding
principle of human dignity. See Furman,408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J. concurring).
81 Here, I refer to the principle applied by Justice Brennan in Furman:
The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: If a punishment is
unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted
arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if
there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more
effectively then some less severe punishment, then the continued infliction
of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that the State may
not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of
crimes.
Id. at 282.
82 See id. at 269-82 (discussing the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in
the context of "the dignity of man").
83 See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring) (indicating that
the death penalty violates the constitution because it is morally unacceptable). The
contemporary legal discourse on the death penalty cannot escape the moral
overtones that come with it. While the issue of constitutionality requires defining
legal statements, reasoning utilized to arrive at any conclusion can be driven by
moral overtones. I argue in this paper that Justice Marshall's principled opposition
to the constitutionality of the death penalty is based on moral values. See id. at 34445 (commenting that the Eighth Amendment provides insulation from the cry of
vengeance that our "baser selves" would ordinarily demand in response to certain
crimes).
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589

doctrines of retribution, 4 deterrence,8 5 and recidivism, 86 while
expounding upon the economics, as well as the political process,
underneath the punishment.8 7 Inquiry into Marshall's opinion
centers on two relationships the Justice holds as guiding
principles to rendering the death penalty unconstitutional.
These are: (i) the relationship between the death penalty and
our society's self-respect, and (ii) the relationship between the
88
death penalty and our society's sense of morality.

84

In Furman, Justice Marshall analyzed the social purposes for the imposition

of the death penalty: retribution, deterrence, recidivism, eugenics, economy, and
encouraging guilty pleas and confessions. See id. at 343-58; see also Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 236-42 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing the
concepts of retribution and deterrence and their relationship to capital punishment).
He systematically considered and eliminated each one of them. First, he eliminated
retribution by itself as a legitimate penological objective as he contended: "[T]he
Eighth Amendment itself was adopted to prevent punishment from becoming
synonymous with vengeance." Furman, 408 U.S. at 343 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Second, he rejected arguments that the death penalty is a necessary deterrent to
crime in society. Citing research, and supporting the idea that the death penalty is
no more effective a deterrent than life imprisonment, Justice Marshall asserted that
"[i]n light of the massive amount of evidence before us, I see no alternative but to
conclude that capital punishment cannot be justified on the basis of its deterrent
effect." Id. at 345-54. Third, Marshall examined evidence contending that convicted
murderers rarely commit murder again even if they are not sentenced to die. See id.
at 355. Next, Justice Marshall established the economic argument that the death
penalty is more expensive than life imprisonment. See id. at 358. Additionally, he
felt the leverage used by the invocation of the death penalty to encourage guilty
pleas and confessions is morally repugnant and a violation of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. This led him to believe that life imprisonment is
penologically sufficient as it "can be used as leverage for bargaining for pleas or
confessions in exchange either for charges of lesser offenses or recommendations of
leniency." Id. at 356.
85 See Furman,408 U.S. at 354 (Marshall, J., concurring).
86 See id. at 355.
87 See id. at 356-58 (opining that capital punishment is, in practice, used not
only to punish but also as a bargaining tool).
88 As mentioned earlier, morality takes an important stage in Marshall's
jurisprudence. See supra note 83. Justice Marshall used moral discourse in
establishing the legal validity of his abolitionist position in several instances during
his Furman opinion. According to him, the death penalty "violates the Eighth
Amendment because it is morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at
this time in their history." Furman, 408 U.S. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Marshall further contended that a punishment is morally acceptable "unless 'it
shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people.'" Id. (quoting United States
v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir. 1952). Justice Marshall then concluded
that, by abolishing the death penalty, "[w]e achieve 'a major milestone in the long
road up from barbarism' and join the approximately 70 other jurisdictions in the
world which celebrate their regard for civilization and humanity by shunning capital
punishment." Id. at 371 (quoting RAMSEY CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 336 (1970)).

590

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:561

If Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman opens up
American jurisprudence's disconnect with the inherent dignity of
humankind, Justice Marshall's argument presents society with a
mirror to confront its moral vulnerability. Justice Marshall's
assault on the constitutionality of the death penalty under the
Clause proceeds in multiple threads. He begins by quietly posing
the haunting Eighth Amendment question-one that goes
straight to the heart of society's attitude-by commenting that
"[tihe question... is not whether we condone rape or murder, for
surely we do not; it is whether capital punishment is 'a
punishment no longer consistent with our own self-respect' and,
therefore, violative of the Eighth Amendment."8 9 Thurgood
Marshall went to great lengths "examining the historical
derivation of the Eighth Amendment," 90 as well as systematically
deconstructing the social purposes of capital punishment, 91 to
arrive at the unconstitutionality of capital punishment on
account of being "excessive,"' 92 "serv[ing] no valid legislative
purpose," 93 and because "popular sentiment abhors it." 94
Although, he does not delve deeper into the relationship between
self-respect and capital punishment, his invocation of "popular
sentiment" 95 opens the door to introduce his second layer of
reasoning, based on a good citizenry argument, to consolidate his
abolitionist hypothesis.
Justice Marshall introduces the issue of self-respect
primarily to jolt the collective consciousness of our society and to
lift us from buried confinement in a false consciousness 96
manifested in the belief, although false, that the penological
practice of state-sanctioned killings can serve value-driven social
goods in contemporary society. Justice Marshall views the Court
as being enmeshed in a jurisprudence that lacks moral
consistency. Thus, he is driven to correct the moral compass of
89 Furman,408 U.S. at 315 (Marshall, J., concurring).
90 Id.

91 See id. at 342-59 (demonstrating the inadequacy of the most widely relied
upon purposes of capital punishment).
92 Id. at 331.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 332
95 Id.

96 I have discussed this concept of false consciousness and collective
consciousness in an upcoming work. See SABY GHOSHRAY, SYMMETRY, RATIONALITY
AND CONSCIOUSNESS: REVISITING MARCUSEAN REPRESSION IN AMERICA'S WAR ON

TERROR (Forthcoming).
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the Court by posing such poignant questions. Even if, however,
we reject Justice Marshall's view on the coupling between the
collective self-respect and retentionist positions, can we divorce
ourselves from his morally laden legal viewpoints on capital
punishment? In particular, when he asserts that "[i]f retribution
alone could serve as a justification for any particular penalty,
then all penalties selected by the legislature would by definition
be acceptable means for designating society's moral approbation
of a particular act," 97 Justice Marshall clearly challenges us to
probe deeper into our collective humanity and confront the
morality of vengeance. Implicit in our recognition of the morality
of vengeance is the clarion call to correct our moral compass by
determining the scope of vengeance out of which we shape our
This revelation, therefore,
existing penological practices.
compels us to make value judgments on whether the call to
evolve our civilization's march to maturity comports with the
penological fundamentals that revolve around vengeance. In this
context, Justice Marshall provides us with concrete and
qualitative guidelines as he encourages us to adhere to the
Constitution's Eighth Amendment while shielding against
societal debasement from the wrongful application of vengeance:
[T]he Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our baser
selves. The 'cruel and unusual' language limits the avenues
through which vengeance can be channeled Were this not so,
the language would be empty and a return98to the rack and other
tortures would be possible in a given case.
While trumpeting the constitutional safeguards of the
Eighth Amendment, Justice Marshall reminds the citizenry of
their moral vulnerability against the imposition of the death
penalty. 99 This moral vulnerability-based reasoning allows
Marshall to declare the death penalty unconstitutional on moral
grounds, as it "nonetheless violates the Eighth Amendment
because it is morally unacceptable to the people of the United
In support of his
States at this time in their history."' 0 0
that a type of
held
argument, Marshall noted that the Court
punishment is morally acceptable "unless 'it shocks the

97 Furman, 408

U.S. at 344 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 345.
99 See id. at 344 ("At times a cry is heard that morality requires vengeance.").
100Id. at 360.
98

592

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:561

conscience and sense of justice of the people.'"101 Here, again,
Justice Marshall referred to the collective consciousness of the
citizenry which must be awakened from its deep slumber to have
any moral validity in the penological practice in question.
Having developed a multi-pronged attack against the
constitutionality of the death penalty on account of moral
vulnerability, societal consciousness, and collective self-respect,
Justice Marshall then advanced his final argument when he
commented that "people who [are] fully informed as to the
purpose of the [death] penalty and its liabilities would find the
penalty shocking, unjust, and unacceptable." 10 2 Could people's
abhorrence towards capital punishment, therefore, help in
advancing Marshall's hypothesis further? Marshall believed "the
question with which [the Court] must deal is not whether a
substantial proportion of American citizens would today, if
polled, opine that capital punishment is barbarously cruel, but
whether they would find it to be so in the light of all information
presently available." 103 Here, Justice Marshall argued that the
kind of information needed for the public to develop conscientious
opinions against the death penalty may not be easily accessible
to it.104 Even if such information is widely available, and easily
accessible, we still may not achieve the abolitionist conclusion
Marshall was seeking. 0 5
Despite the majority of Justices
missing the moral connotations of Furman, can we escape the
inevitable morality argument impregnated within the death
penalty's legal discourse?
The morality of capital punishment did not acquire a
consistent footing in Furman, as it took only four years for the
Supreme Court to bring back the constitutional legitimacy of the
death penalty 0 6 in Gregg v. Georgia.1 7 The decision in Gregg
101Id. (quoting United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir. 1952)).
102
103

Id. at 361.
Id. at 362.

104 See id.
at 362-63 (pointing out the existence of statistical information about
convicted felons during their time in prison, after their release into society, and
while on death row of which the public is largely unaware).
105 See supra notes 84 and 88 (discussing Justice Marshall's abolitionist
position). For a more comprehensive discussion of the Justice Marshall's objections
to capital punishment, see MICHAEL MELLO, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: THE
RELENTLESS DISSENTS OF JUSTICES BRENNAN AND MARSHALL, 11-13, 143-44, 18284, 187-89 (1996).
106 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion) (affirming
the death penalty as an appropriate form of punishment under certain
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served two purposes. First, it affirmed the constitutional hurdle
presented in Furman, which hinged fundamentally on the
08
arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty.'
Second, Gregg sought to overcome that by pointing to both
Georgia's newly legislated bifurcating trial procedure, 10 9 as well
as comparative review, 110 and thus eliminating the capricious
and arbitrary element from the process to make it more
predictable and fair. 1 ' In trying to give the appearance of
consistency with regards to the death sentence, the Court again
got lost in its attempt to develop a moral consistency surrounding
the process. Justice Stewart brought up a vague moral argument
to advance a retributive justification of capital punishment: "The
death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes:
retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective
circumstances). Some challenges under state constitutions were temporarily
successful, holding that the death penalty was a form of cruel and unusual
punishment, before later being superseded by amendments. See People v. Anderson,
493 P.2d 880, 899 (Cal. 1972) (stating that the death penalty was determined to be
"impermissibly cruel" by six of the seven judges of the California Supreme Court
because "[iut degrades and dehumanizes all who participate in its processes. It is
unnecessary to any legitimate goal of the state and is in incompatible with the
dignity of man and the judicial process."), superseded by statute, CAL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 27; Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass. 1980)
(plurality opinion) (stating that "the death penalty is unacceptable under
contemporary standards of decency in its unique and inherent capacity to inflict
pain. The mental agony is, simply and beyond question, a horror."), superseded by
statute, MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVI. "[A]rbitrariness and discrimination...
inevitably persist even under a statute which meets the demands of Furman .... "
Id. at 1286. "[Ihe supreme punishment of death, inflicted as it is by chance and
caprice, may not stand." Id. "The death sentence itself is a declaration that society
deems the prisoner a nullity, less than human and unworthy to live." Id. at 1293
(Liacos, J., concurring).
107 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
108 See id. at 189-90 (plurality opinion) (stating that a jury's discretion in
imposing the death penalty should be limited to minimize the risk of arbitrary and
capricious action).
109 The bifurcated proceeding was inserted in the Georgia statute to overcome
the randomness and arbitrariness of Furman. Therefore, the penalty phase was
separately considered after the adjudication of guilt, where the jury was required to
hear both aggravating and mitigating evidence. See id. at 162-64 (referencing the
bifurcated procedure). Additionally, the statute made it mandatory for the jury to
make specific findings of certain permissible, aggravating circumstances to justify
the death penalty. See id. at 164-66. Incorporating a mandatory appeal process in
which the Supreme Court of Georgia was required to compare the penalty to similar
cases ensured the proportionality of the punishment of crime. See id. at 166-67.
110 Id. at 167.
111 Id. at 195 (summarizing that it is possible to construct a standard that

ensures the death penalty will not be imposed unfairly).
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offenders.
In part, capital punishment is an expression of
society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct." 112 On
the other hand, Justice Powell clearly understood the weakness
of his "moral outrage" 113 theory as he backpedaled immediately
by commenting that "[t]his function may be unappealing to
many, but it is essentially in an ordered society that asks its
citizen to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to
11 4
vindicate their wrongs."
The Supreme Court got it wrong in Gregg when it tried to
advance a fairness argument to establish the constitutionality of
the death penalty without including the issues of race and
class. 115 Since neither issue can ever be eliminated from the
death penalty equation, the Court can never eradicate the
6
arbitrary and capricious elements established in Furman."
Additionally, by linking the death penalty's retributive appeal
with the orderliness of contemporary society, the Court failed the
"evolving standards of decency"11 7 test of Trop. Justice Stewart
further complicated his position by developing a misplaced value
judgment on human dignity as he echoed the dissenting opinion
of Chief Justice Burger in Furman,"8 noting: "Indeed, the
Id. at 183.
Id.
114 Id.
115I would argue that the variety of subjective dimensions, ranging from the
divergences between severe and lenient judges, and the difference between judges on
either side of the abolitionist debate, to the qualitative differences between good and
bad prosecution and defense, influence heavily the outcome of a death penalty case.
These subjective dimensions are further shaped by race and class in a way that can
never fully eradicate the influencing factors because the evidence on record, and the
findings made, have been influenced by these factors, and there is nothing that can
be done on appeal to remedy their influence. Some state courts acknowledged this
before being superseded by constitutional amendments. See Dist. Attorney for
Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1282 (Mass. 1980) (plurality opinion)
(holding that the death penalty is unconstitutionally cruel under the Massachusetts
State Constitution and stating that "[w]hile [the] Court has the power to correct
constitutional or other errors retroactively ... it cannot, of course, raise the dead"),
superseded by statute, MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVI. Therefore, the possibility of
error is always present in a justice system that deals with the punishment of death,
and, as a result, we can never completely eliminate the elements of arbitrariness
and randomness from the capital justice system.
116 See id. at 1283-86 (commenting, among other things, that the death penalty
will inevitably be applied arbitrarily).
117 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190 (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958)).
118 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383-84 (1972) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
112
113

2006]

POST-ROPER CAPITAL JURISPRUDENCE

decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate
sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's
belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to
humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of
death." 119 The Court's inconsistency in its morality-laced and
human dignity-centric argument becomes more pronounced as
we examine Justice Brennan's Gregg dissent, in which he
steadfastly holds his ground in Furman, "that the State, even as
it punishes, must treat its citizens in a manner consistent with
their intrinsic worth as human beings-a punishment must not
12 0
be so severe as to be degrading to human dignity."'
The Court's fragmented and vacillating consciousness came
to light again in Woodson v. North Carolina,'21 a case decided the
same day as the Gregg decision. 22 Here, the Court held
mandatory death sentences to be unconstitutional on the grounds
of violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. 23 The
Court painted a humane face to counter death penalty, as it
rightly asserted that the death penalty deprives individual
humans
from
exhibiting
their
unique
and
inherent
characteristics. 124 It denigrates death's equalizing effect on all
humans by debasing them into a faceless, dehumanized mass of
insignificance as "[i]t treats all persons convicted of a designated
offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as
members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to
119 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 (plurality opinion).

Id. at 229.
428 U.S. 280 (1976).
122 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153 (indicating the case was decided on July 2, 1976);
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280 (indicating the case was decided on July 2, 1976).
123 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion).
124 The Woodson case confronted the imposition of the death penalty as a
mandatory punishment for capital crimes. North Carolina legislators attempted to
overcome the Furman condition of the arbitrary and wanton jury discretion by
legislating mandatory death penalty sentences for the commission of a capital
offense. The statute read as follows: "Murderin the first and second degree defined;
punishment.-A murder which shall be perpetrated by ... any.., willful, deliberate
and premeditated killing.., shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and
shall be punished with death." Id. at 286. Justices in the plurality, however, saw it
differently. They argued that the Furman arbitrariness shifted to the guild phase of
the trial as greater discretion is introduced as a result of fixing the outcome of the
penalty phase of the trial. This, again, violates the Furman court's findings that
sentences must reflect the character of the individual, thereby embracing the
inherent uniqueness of individual humans. See id. at 304 (acknowledging that
fundamental respect for humanity requires consideration of the character and record
of the individual defendant).
120

121

596

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:561

the blind infliction of the penalty of death."'125 Despite developing
schizophrenic doctrinal themes surrounding moral discourse, the
Supreme Court maintained its constitutional guarantees of
individualized sentencing through Furman, Gregg, and Woodson.
I would argue that this consistency in understanding the
uniqueness of individual human personhood resides in a unique
disposition of moral contour in a more Aristotelian sense 126 that
has continued through Lockett v. Ohio, 27 until the Supreme
Court lost its moral contour while subsumed by a new kind of
legal discourse influenced by emotionalism 28 and jury
125 Id. at 304.
126 The normative ethical perspective of moral equity was originated by
Aristotle, and defined by Rawls: "All social primary goods-liberty and opportunity,
income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally
unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the
least favored." JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 303 (1971). Here, Rawlism legal
justice attempts to bring equitable application across all constituents, but law's
inherent deficiencies sometimes make equitable application untenable, the same
way Furman's prescribed consistency in death sentences has become untenable in
the long run. This, therefore, calls for developing actions that can correct the defects
in moral consistency and trace a path of moral contour along the rigid lines of law.
This is what Aristotle described as moral contour formation. See ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 140-43 (Martin Ostwald trans., Macmillan Publ'g Co. 1962)
(opining that law is not always equitable and this is why not all things are
determined by law).
127 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Here, the Supreme Court overturned the petitioner's
death sentence on the grounds that the legislators in Ohio failed to leave a sufficient
spectrum of categories from which the right mitigating factors could be selected to
either counter balance the aggravating factors, or recognize the unique individuality
of criminal defendants. Here, Lockett's attempt to form moral contours by finding
appropriate law that provides unbridled judge or jury discretion can be traced back
to Furman'sendeavor to attain moral consistency in death sentencing.
128 In 1986, in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987), the Supreme Court
considered for the first time whether the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution
disallows victim impact evidence from being introduced in capital sentencing. The
Furman court found cruel and unusual and, thus, unconstitutional, any factor
rendering a death sentence "arbitrary." As a result, the Court in Booth, 482 U.S. at
509, and, two years later, in South Carolinav. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810-12 (1989),
held that victim impact evidence appeals to the emotions of the sentencing jury thus
rendering them incapable of imposing a rational, non-arbitrary judgment. In a
historical reversal similar to the Furman-Greggdyad, the Court made an about-face
in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), and held incorrect its rulings in both
Booth and Gathers. Payne, 510 U.S. at 825-27. While dissecting the argument for
the Payne court's decision to violate the principle of stare decisis, Professor Jeffrey
Abramson established moral relevancy as the primary theme, as he noted:
[The Court faulted the Booth court's theory of moral relevancy as one that
"unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial".
But the Court's larger
point was that evidence of the harm done by a murder is morally relevant
to the blameworthiness of he who would murder. One who murders
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deliberation in capital cases. 129 As the accompanying footnotes
suggest, these cases fueled the constitutional debate over the
tension between universalizing and individualizing the death
penalty judgments.
As more research is undertaken to
understand how juries function in capital cases, 130 our conscience
necessarily accepts the risk that the victim may have relatives and that his
death by homicide will hurt and harm others. Thus Payne thought that
Booth was simply mistaken in rejecting the moral relevance of victim
impact testimony to the individual moral guilt of the defendant. ... In
many if not most death penalty hearings, Payne asserted, victim impact
testimony places "moral force" behind the state's evidence and helps the
capital sentencer [sic] appreciate concretely and in context the actual harm
caused by the defendant.
Abramson, supra note 21, at 132 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 822, 825). For an
informative discussion on VIS, see JENNIFER L. CULBERT, The Sacred Name of Pain:
The Role of Victim Impact Evidence in Death Penalty Sentencing Decisions, in PAIN,
DEATH AND THE LAW 103-19 (Austin Sarat & Ann Arbor eds., Univ. Press 2001).
According to Professor Abramson, Payne's emotionalism "stood in stark contrast to
the promise of Furman to create procedures that would foster reasoned uses of moral
discretion." Abramson, supra note 21, at 134.
129 Jurors' confusion as a result of faulty instructions or partial guidance has
been the driving theme in several high profile Supreme Court cases. Abramson
noted that "a substantial number of capital jurors reported that the wording of
judicial instructions misled them into believing that they must sentence the
defendant to death once they found the presence of a statutory aggravating
circumstance." Abramson, supra note 21, at 135. In this context, Justice Marshall
noted the extremely difficult position faced by capital penalty jurors as, according to
him, they are given "only partial guidance" and afforded "substantial discretion." See
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333 (1985). For Justice Marshall, the problem
is compounded as the jury instructions makes it possible that a jury can feel less
responsible about sentencing or adjudicating error if they have the knowledge that
any error can be overcome during the appellate process. Id. at 331-32. For a detailed
discussion on interjecting Furman arbitrariness in death sentencing via inadequate
jury instructions, see MELLO, supra note 105, at 180-95.
130 In his article, William Bowers described the findings from the 1990s Capital
Jury Project, which interviewed 1155 capital jurors from 340 trials in fourteen
states. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and
Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1077-86 (1995) (outlining how the
study was conducted). Bower's revelation in another article confronts us with the
Furmanarbitrariness all over again.
In their interviews, some jurors explicitly stated that it was their belief
that aggravation required death; others used language that more indirectly
conveyed the same impression. Accordingly, jurors reported that at the
penalty deliberations, they arrived at a death sentence based on the
presence of one or more aggravating factors that, to their minds, led
necessarily to that penalty.
Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt Is
Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1032 (2001); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells,
Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2
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is being jolted by the continued prevalence of arbitrariness and
capriciousness' 31-the twin pillars of evil identified in Furman.
On the other hand, victim impact statements continue to inject
the randomness decision-making process in death penalty

deliberations. 132
Although the arbitrariness of the death penalty was
examined by various Justices during the post-Locket era, the
Court somewhat backtracked from its path of developing a moral
consistency, which centered on the cruel and unusual nature of
death penalty. This is partly because the majority of Justices
either did not subscribe to a human dignity centric value, 133 or
did not engage in an "evolving standards of decency"'134 argument
surrounding the violability of human life. 135 In part, this is due
136
I
to contemporary society's view on capital punishment.

(1993) (indicating how jury instructions regarding the death penalty affect the jury's
verdict).
131 See Bentele & Bowers, supra note 130, at 1032 (describing some jurors' belief
that the finding of an aggravating factor necessitates a sentence of death).
132 See discussion supra note 128 (describing the emotional impact of victim
impact statements on jurors).
133 See discussion infra note 239 (outlining the concept of human dignity).
134See supra note 72 (explaining "evolving standards of decency").
135See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (discussing evolving standards
of decency and its relationship to human dignity and worth).
136 Against the 10-year death penalty moratorium, new death penalty laws
ushered in more aggressive death penalty jurisprudence. On January 17, 1977, Gary
Gilmore faced his firing squad by proclaiming, "Let's do it." He became the first
prisoner since 1976 to be executed under the new death penalty laws. Whereas,
Kenneth Boyd, on December 2, 2005, became the 1000th person to be executed since
the death penalty was reintroduced. See Recent Legal History of the Death Penalty
http://usgovinfo.about.comlibrary/weekly/
Resume,
Executions
America:
in
bldeathpenalty.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2006); see also Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty for Persons Convicted of Murder, United
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
1953-2006,
Years
States, Selected
t2512006.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2006) (demonstrating society's acceptance of
capital punishment). Numerous opinion polls have been conducted to gauge the
public position on the death penalty. Consistently, polls dictate that a majority of the
American public supports the death penalty. Consider the following: In May 2005, a
Gallup poll stated that 74% of respondees are in "favor of the death penalty for a
person convicted of murder." The poll highlights that when life imprisonment
without parole was given as an option instead of the death penalty, 56% supported
the death penalty, and 39% supported life imprisonment. Again, in May 2003, 37%
of Gallup poll respondees chose "Eye for an Eye Punishment" as the reason they
favor the death penalty. This same poll noted that 61% of respondees in May of 2005
believe the "death penalty is applied fairly in this country." Public Opinion and the
Death Penalty, Public Opinion Polls, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/deathl
opinion.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2006).
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contend, however, that neither Justice Brennan nor Justice
Marshall accepted the conventional moral position of the
majority. 137 Therefore, it was in their relentless dissents against
the death penalty 138 that the moral contour of the Supreme Court
remained intact. While Brennan gave primacy to the intrinsic
morality of the Eighth Amendment, 139 Marshall put great
expectations in the moral values of the informed citizenry. 140
During later years, this moral contour became further solidified
through the moral reasoning and human-value laden arguments
of Justices Stevens,14 ' Kennedy, 142 and Breyer, 143 which has
137 See supra notes 83 and 88 (noting the role of morality in Marshall's death
penalty opinions).
138 See generally MELLO, supra note 105 (offering a detailed discussion of both
Justices' sustained dissents to opinions upholding the death penalty).
139 See supra notes 68, 69, 73, 77 (referencing Brennan's focus on human dignity
and fundamental human worth).
140 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 332 (1972) (per curiam) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (noting that a punishment may be invalid if "popular sentiment abhors
it").
141 Perhaps our greatest challenge is to untangle the jurisprudence of Justice
Stevens within the death penalty debate. Besides a paucity of available opinions
from which to extricate Stevens' tendencies, his narrow decision-making and "one
case at a time" policy makes it rather irrelevant to engage in scholarship to develop
groundwork for foreign court citation analysis. At times, Stevens' apparent
liberalism tempts us to delve deeper into his jurisprudence for indications of a
predilection toward an abolitionist position, yet his unpredictability thwarts us from
doing so. Stevens' engaged in judicial minimalism, the concept of "saying no more
than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided."
See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1996). For more information on Justice Stevens'
jurisprudential tendencies, see Ghoshray, supra note 68, at 735. For a more general
discussion of judicial minimalism, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
142 A reading of Roper illuminates Kennedy's jurisprudence, where he believes
that the judges are bound to expand the frontiers of liberty and privacy by enforcing
the larger values and principles in the Constitution. In his earlier decision in Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992), Kennedy cited psychological studies to argue
that the death penalty for juvenile offenders is disproportionate because, as a class,
juveniles are less developed emotionally and intellectually, and, hence, more
susceptible to peer pressure. Roper's promise to broaden individual freedom and
solidify human dignity is enshrined in Kennedy's understanding of constitutional
commitment, which he believes is in consonance with the evolution of humanistic
and just jurisprudence in other parts of the world. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 578 (2005) ("[T]he express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other
nations and peoples ... underscores the centrality of those ... rights within our own
heritage."). Of all the current Supreme Court Justices, Justice Kennedy endorses
perhaps the most expansive view of personal liberty. Therefore, he seeks to
investigate the broader provisions of the Constitution on issues of moral rights,
governmental power, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. This quest
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culminated in the path-breaking decisions of Roper and Atkins.

III.

SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE

MEETS PAPAL PHILOSOPHY: NORMATIVE ALIGNMENT
OR ACCIDENTAL COINCIDENCE?

As we ponder the consequences of the Court's decisions in
Atkins and Roper, we cannot extricate ourselves from the moral
relevancy of the term "cruel" within the Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. The issue is whether the moral content alone can
invalidate the consistency of penal practices based on sociopolitical and historical traditions. This will require us to identify
the full scope and dimensions of the moral discourse within the
Court's judicial decision making in Atkins and Roper so that the
death penalty debate can stand alone. My contention is that any
analysis of morality in constitutional adjudication is incomplete
without a discussion of the inherent dignity of the human person.
In this analysis, therefore, I seek confirmation within Pope John
Paul II's writings on dignity of human persons as I juxtapose the
has led Kennedy to look to comparative constitutional interpretation even before he
came to the Supreme Court. As a result, Justice Kennedy has become extremely
comfortable in turning to, and seeking guidance from, the law and practices of other
nations. In Roper, Justice Kennedy opens the door for a thorough examination of the
developmental differences between adolescents and adults, and sets the stage for a
collision course between our punitive sense of justice and the scholars' view of
juvenile crime. By introducing scientific confirmation on developmental differences
between adolescents and adults, the Court essentially supports the assertion that
juveniles are less culpable for their criminal actions, and, hence, challenges us to
embrace the rehabilitative ideal in adolescent criminal jurisprudence by taking the
punitive focus off our juvenile criminal law. Could this opinion in Roper be the
groundwork to alter harsh punishments against juvenile criminal dependents in
non-death penalty cases? See Ghoshray, supra note 68, at 729.
143 Justice
Breyer's jurisprudence sits at the confluence of contrasting
intellectual and philosophical developments. His consequentialism guides the
process by finding its trajectory from the Constitution, where the text is viewed as a
contract with the citizens. Within a broader formalism of this contractual paradigm
lies the smaller subset of Breyer's jurisprudence, an active liberty for the people, a
reasonable sovereignty for the larger collective organism (the State), and a restraint
in judicial activism. The contract with the people requires the fulfillment of the best
interest of the individual, although, at times it may come at odds with the expansive
concept of liberty, and at times as an antithesis to the judiciary's concept of
federalism. In the end, however, it is firmly anchored in pragmatic
consequentialism, which will continue to be the hallmark of his jurisprudence. Its
pursuit will continue to reverberate across the constitutional courts, from Zimbabwe
to Australia, and will find its way into the opinions of our Supreme Court through
Justice Breyer's analyses. For more information, see Dr. Saby Ghoshray, supra note
68, at 735.
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Supreme Court's morality-based capital jurisprudence along the
moral contours of the late Pontiff's philosophy of human dignity.
Embedded at the heart of the Eighth Amendment's
characterization of "cruel" and "inhuman" punishment is the
value-centric, dignity-laden conception of humankind, whose
inherent dignity cannot be stripped away by the mere invocation
of man's law. This individual human, therefore, endowed with
full dignity, exists in an environment where his existence is
marked by an expansive conception of "liberty." This is reflected
in John Paul II's writings, as he lends credence to a broader
frontier of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence:
Man has acquired full awareness of his dignity, of the heights to
which he is raised, of the surpassing worth of his own
humanity, and of the meaning of his existence ...what is in
question here is man in all his truth, in his full magnitude. We
are not dealing with the "abstract" man, but the real, "concrete,"
"historical" man. Each man in all the unrepeatable reality of
what he is and what he does, of his intellect and will, of his
conscience and heart in his unique unrepeatable human
reality. 144
In this context, John Paul II considers a "heightened sense of
the dignity of the human person and of his or her uniqueness,
and of the respect due to the journey of conscience ...one of the
positive achievements of modern culture." 14 5 Legal philosophies
are borne out of historic and cultural traditions that help shape
legal governance. Therefore, it is expected that evolution of law
should be in stride with positive achievements of our modern
culture, marked by a decent respect for the dignity of the human
person. John Paul II contends that giving primacy to the dignity
of human life inculcates in us a greater respect for the value of
human life-one worth preserving via developing a "culture of
life" 146 in the face of a "culture of death."14 7 Therefore, the
11 (1979),
144 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER REDEMPTOR HOMINIS
availableat http://www.ourladyswarriors.org/teachlredehomi.htm#-2K.
145 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER VERITATIS SPLENDOR 31.3 (1993).
146 EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 11, T 21.1.
147 POPE JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION ECCLESIA IN

63 (1999)
ON THE ENCOUNTER WITH THE LIWNG JESUS CHRIST
[hereinafter ECCLESIA IN AMERICA], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/
john-paul iiapost exhortations/documents/hfjp-ii exh_22011999_ecclesia-inamericaen.html.
AMERICA
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Supreme Court's explicit ban on certain classes of capital
punishment is not a judicial arrogation, nor is it arbitrary
decision-making; rather, it contains a sacred, moral fiber, laden
with hope for a future where such a "culture of life" will
completely overcome the "culture of death."
The foundation of John Paul I's principled opposition to the
death penalty is shaped by his philosophy of the inherent dignity
of human life. This philosophy centers on his sacred belief that
humankind is created in the image of God, which automatically
bestows in humans an inherent dignity that is irrelevant and
irrespective of personal traits. He says: "[T]he dignity of human
life must never be taken away, even in the case of someone who
has done great evil."'148 While acknowledging the traditional
penological objectives as enshrined in the trifecta of retribution,
rehabilitation, and societal protection, John Paul II echoed the
cautious approach the Supreme Court has undertaken since
Furman when he commented that "the nature and extent of the
punishment must be carefully evaluated"149-echoing
in
unmistakable terms the heightened due process needs of our
death is different jurisprudence. From a doctrinal point of view,
John Paul II does not reject the death penalty outright, as he
believes in the justification of death penalty in cases "of absolute
necessity ...when it would not be possible otherwise to defend

society."'150 He put forth arguments, however, that eradicated the
utility of the death penalty as a procedure. Because John Paul II
contended that "redress[ing] the violation of personal and social
rights" is the "primary purpose" of punishment, it seems that the
value of human life and the need to offer the offender the
possibility of rehabilitation eradicates any need for capital
punishment. 151 However, in his opinion, "[t]oday, given the
means at the State's [sic] disposal to deal with crime and control
those who commit it, without abandoning all hope of their
redemption, the cases where it is absolutely necessary to do away
with an offender 'are now very rare, even non-existent.' "152 This

148

Pope John Paul II, Homily Delivered at the Papal Mass, St. Louis, Mo. (Jan.

27,
1999), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul.ii/travels/
documents/hf.jp-iihom_27011999_stloisen.html.
149 EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 11,
56.2.
150 Id.
151 Id.
56.1.
152 ECCLESIA INAMERICA, supra note 147, at
63.
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is where John Paul II sows the seed for total abolition of the
death penalty as a penological procedure.
What is, then, the "absolute necessity" of the death penalty
from society's survival point of view? It is clear that if the society
cannot establish "absolute necessity" for the imposition of the
Therefore, the
death penalty, we must end the practice.
uniqueness of the death penalty and the history of its capricious
application in the criminal justice system make it imperative on
us to delve deeper into the legal discourse of this punishment.
Our earlier exploration of the jurisprudential philosophies of
Justice Brennan went to great lengths to systematically analyze
all available social objectives sought in this discourse, and
Brennan concluded that the death penalty does not serve any
rational purpose. 53 This is precisely the context in which John
Paul II challenges us to consider the death penalty debate, as he
asserts: "This is the context in which to place the problem of the
death penalty. On this matter there is a growing tendency, both
in the Church and in civil society, to demand that it be applied in
154
a very limited way or even that it be abolished completely."
This I see as the beginning of the Catholic Church's shift towards
a more robust abolitionist philosophy, even though there is
confusion over the explicit position to that effect. 155 Why now is
153

See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J.,

concurring).
EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 11,

56.1.
Although there has been internal debate within the Catholic Church on its
official position on the death penalty, it is clear that the overriding theme within the
Church is directed towards life. The leaders within the Church, from the Bishops to
the Pope and even the Lay, have expressed this life attitude. The Vatican's position
was made abundantly clear in 2001, when it said: "The Holy See has engaged itself
in the pursuit of the abolition of capital punishment as an integral part of the
defense of human life at every stage of its development, and does so in defiance of
any assertion of a culture of death." Cacp.org, Catholics Against Capital
Punishment: What the Vatican Has Said, http://cacp.org/vaticandocuments.html
(click on left hand tab "Q & As") (last visited Aug. 25, 2006) (quoting UNITED STATES
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Declarationto the World Congress on the Death
Penalty, France (June 2001)). Additionally, Amnesty International conducted an
interview with Bishop Gabino Zavala of the Los Angeles Archdiocese discussing the
death penalty. The interview shed light on the tradition within the Church to pursue
life over death. The interview also shed light on the Pope's attitude about the death
penalty. Here, I am providing only a select portion of the interview, but the complete
interview is available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/event2/zavala.html. The
interview is between "S," the interviewer, and "Bishop," Bishop Gabino Zavala. The
interview begins as follows:
154
155
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the Church developing a principled opposition to death penalty?
The Pope argued for a penological practice that comports with
human dignity, 156 echoing Justice Brennan's view, examined
earlier, 157 that "[t]he problem must be viewed in the context of a
system of penal justice ever more in line with human dignity and

S: I would like to start with you providing us with a general overview of the
perspective of Catholicism on the death penalty.
Bishop: As with many of our traditions and our teachings, over the years,
as we understand more, it has developed. At one time we as a Church gave
the right to the state to decide on the death penalty, the question of the
death penalty and so it was the state that had the right to put someone into
death if they so deemed it. But I think the position of the Church now is
that the guiding principle would be that every life is sacred and it doesn't
matter if it's the life of an elderly person, of a child, or of a criminal, every
life is sacred. And so no one has a right to take the life of another, even on
behalf of the state. And so that that's what we try to promote now, that the
sacredness of life is something that we have to promote.
S: Have any Catholic groups or organizations adopted an official position on
the death penalty?
Bishop: There are. There are a number of groups that really work to abolish
here in the United States the death penalty and are opposed to the death
penalty. One, which I am a member of, is the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops. A few years ago they came out on Good Friday with a
pastoral letter where they declared, where we declared our opposition
against the death penalty for the reasons that I have mentioned. There are
other groups like Death Penalty Focus and religious communities as well of
men and women who have consistently spoken out against the death
penalty and whose efforts are at working to abolish the death penalty.
S: What is the Pope's position on the death penalty?
Bishop: The Pope has been very articulate, in fact more articulate than
some people would like him to be, against the death penalty. He has come
out recently in his visit.., when he came to St. Louis he was very clear on
speaking against the death penalty and promoting life, and saying that as a
community, the death penalty diminishes us and so that we need to abolish
that. He also, in his letter Evangelium Vitae, where he talks about the
gospel of life and within the context of life he spoke against the death
penalty. So he has been very articulate and very clear in his opposition to
the death penalty.
S: What do you see as the role of the Catholic faith community, particularly
Catholic faith leaders, in the movement to abolish the death penalty?
Bishop: Well I think one of the things the Catholic community needs to do,
and the Catholic leaders need to do, is that we as the Church need to
express wherever appropriate and wherever possible our stance against the
death penalty.
Interview by "S" with Bishop Gabino Zavala, Auxiliary Bishop, Archdiocese of Los
Angeles, availableat http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/event2/zavala.html.
156 See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 11,
56.1.
157 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the
death penalty is inconsistent with human dignity).
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thus, in the end, with God's plan for a man and society."1 58 As to
human dignity-centric punishment procedures, he offers two
social objectives.
In the first, he felt that by applying
punishment that did not strip the offender of his or her inherent
dignity, society could reduce disorder. 159 Second, he suggests
that by incorporating such punishment, society can embark upon
establishing a much greater goal-that of fulfilling its
160
rehabilitative ideals.
In the preceding section, we spoke at length about Furman
and its holdings against the imposition of arbitrary and random
death sentences, while recognizing the required threshold of
individualizing the punishment procedure. 161 More than two
decades later, Pope John Paul II echoed similar restraints and
overtly promoted a cautious approach towards the imposition of
death penalty, as he observed:
"It is clear that, for these
purposes to be achieved, the nature and extent of the punishment
",162
must be carefully evaluated and decided upon .
As we illuminate ourselves in a humanistic jurisprudence
163
that reiterates the opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall,
or the majority opinions of Justices Kennedy and Stevens, 164 or
the teachings of the former Cardinal Karol Wojtyla of Krakow,
we can't help but become jolted by their odd coincidences. I do
not suggest there exists a causal relationship between the
religious teachings and the legal discourse of the Highest Court,
nor do I believe either entity influenced the other. What I do
assert, however, is that the principled opposition against the
158 See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 11,

56.1.
159 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH,
2266 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining
that when punishment conforms to human dignity, and is accepted by the guilty
party, the punishment assumes the value of expiation).
160 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH,
2266 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that
punishment must "contribute to the correction of the guilty party").
161 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding it a denial of
human dignity for a state to arbitrarily impose an unusually severe punishment).
162 EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 11,
56.
163 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (reiterating that it is
"cruel and unusual" to arbitrarily impose the death sentence); id. at 315 (Marshall,
J., concurring) (questioning whether capital punishment is consistent with "our own
self-respect").
16 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61, 564-68 (2005) (finding the
death penalty for children under eighteen unconstitutional because inconsistent
with "evolving standards of decency"); id. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reiterating
the importance of "evolving standards of decency" in determining the
constitutionality of capital punishment).
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death penalty evidenced here weaves a continuous tapestry of
moral contour development that has been nurtured over the
decades. That tapestry sometimes focused on the inviolability of
human persons, 165 and at other times relied upon either the
immorality of vengeance, 166 or the moral vulnerability of
society. 167 In this journey, what the venerable Justices have
called the "evolving standards of decency,"' 168 the Pope has
termed the "concrete conditions of the common good,"169-an idea
all the while forging us closer to a society free from the practice
70
of "tinker[ing] with the machinery of death."'
IV. WHAT DOES ROPER AND ATKINS HOLD FOR THE FUTURE OF
THE DEATH PENALTY?

Three decades after its reintroduction in Gregg, the Supreme
Court continued to struggle in its attempt to overcome the
Furman threshold of arbitrariness and capriciousness. Along the
way, the Court grappled with the death penalty's qualitatively
different challenges. These challenges came from the tension
between universalizing procedure, and individualizing the
defendant. Challenges also arose from capricious interpretations
of the threshold of culpability for capital murder.171 The inherent
165 See discussion supra note 238 (describing the inviolability of the human
person).
166 See discussion supra note 15 (noting the historic relevance of vengeance).
167

As I have traced the moral contour of the Supreme Court's capital

jurisprudence, I used moral vulnerability synonymously with penchant for morality
or morality-centered philosophy.
168 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 (inquiring into society's "evolving standards
of decency").
169 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2267 (2d ed. 1997).
170 This phrase holds special significance in the dramatic conclusion of Justice
Blackmun's Callins dissent. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
171 Post-Furman death penalty statutes attempted to balance individualized
sentencing procedures with guided discretion. Stephen R. McAllister succinctly
captured the debate:
[T]he Supreme Court identified and applied two primary principles that
now form the core of the Court's Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence.
These principles are that (1) the sentencer must be given specific guidance
regarding how to determine when death is an appropriate sentence (the
"guided discretion" principle) and (2) in making the determination, the
sentencer must be permitted to consider each defendant's situation on an
individual basis (the "individualized sentencing" principle).
Stephen R. McAllister, The Problem of Implementing a Constitutional System of
CapitalPunishment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 1039, 1040 (1995).
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human fallibility failed to explicate race and class bias, 172 and,
thus, legislative divergence in jury instruction became even more
pronounced. 173 Within this vast array of Supreme Court death
penalty decisions, however, we may take comfort in the
illuminating opinions of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
Douglas, Stevens, Kennedy, and Breyer. In those opinions, we
see a sustained effort to develop a moral contour encapsulating
an authentic view of the human person. 174 Despite relentless
tinkering with the law to develop a consistent practice for
determining who dies and who lives, death penalty jurisprudence
remains hopelessly fraught with Furman-eraarbitrariness. The
decisions in Atkins and Roper, therefore, signal a willingness to
change the subjective dimension of the Eighth Amendment's
requirement that the decision to impose the death penalty be
based upon the character and background of the offender in a
more objective framework. 175 This concept prompted the Court to
develop an additional framework so that its decisions could be
justified on legal grounds. While in Atkins the Court cited a

Noting the logical incompatibility of these two principles, McAllister further
noted: "Neither principle can be extended except at the expense of the other. The
Supreme Court largely has ignored the conflict.... [Until the full Court
acknowledges the dilemma, no solution will be forthcoming." Id. at 1100.
172 In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Court confronted the issue of
race and class bias. The petitioner, McCleskey, relied on statistical studies to argue
that he was denied the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection on the basis of the
established discriminatory differences in sentencing blacks and whites to diverging
punishments for similar crimes. In rejecting his claim, Justice Powell argued that
the burden of proving an equal protection violation involves proving the "'existence
of purposeful discrimination.'" McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (quoting Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)). Justice Brennan argued passionately throughout
his dissent and noted that "evidence shows that there is a better than even chance in
Georgia that race will influence the decision to impose the death penalty: a majority
of defendants in white-victim crimes would not have been sentenced to die if their
victims had been black." Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173 See MELLO, supra note 105, at 180-195 (noting the divergence in judicial
opinion regarding the permissibility of prosecutorial conduct that minimizes a
juror's sense of responsibility in imposing the death penalty).
174 An authentic view of the human person is, in my mind, an evolving concept
centering on the uniqueness of the human being, immutability of death, and sacred
nature of inherent human dignity. I elaborate on the authentic-human-persondriven moral underpinnings of the judiciary in the next section.
175 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (construing the Eighth
Amendment in light of "'evolving standards of decency' "); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 572-75 (2005) (discussing and purporting to apply an individualized
analysis of the defendant).
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shift 176 in public opinion during the preceding decade and half
since Penry,177 the Court in Roper developed a standard of
measurement for Atkins' reliance on public consensus 178 and
advanced the doctrine of diminished culpability. 179 Is this the
long-awaited abolitionist future? Though laudable, the process
through which the Supreme Court arrived at the two decisions
opens up a Pandora's Box on several grounds. On the flip side, I
want to show that the Court's decision was in line with moral
contour formation, an area more misunderstood than explored.180
The advocates for persons with mental disabilities exult in the
impressive victory earned in Atkins,18 while the campaigners
against the death penalty bask in the glorious possibilities of an
abolitionist future. 82 While the majority's opinion in Atkins may
be another stepping stone to make the administration of capital
punishment more equitable, I see the juxtaposition of legal
proceedings and clinical diagnoses bringing in additional layers
of ambiguities that may never escape Furman arbitrariness. I do
not fail to see, however, the ethical vision of the human person
that Pope John Paul II tried to imbibe in our civilization's quest
to achieve greater heights. Neither do I miss the continued
endeavor by the judiciary's moral contour building; yet, I am
concerned about the possibility that Atkins may lose its way in
176 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16 (pointing to the large number of states
restricting use of capital punishment since the Court's decision in Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
177 See Penry, 492 U.S. at 302.
178 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 566-67 (relying on "objective indicia of [public]
consensus" as sufficient evidence that society views juveniles as less culpable than
the average criminal and, thus, that capital punishment is inappropriate for such
offenders).
179 See id. at 569-71 (recognizing and explaining the reduced culpability of
juveniles).
180 Throughout this paper, I explain this concept. See Parts I, IV, and V
(explaining that throughout the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
constitutionality of the death penalty, there has been a sustained effort by some
justices to develop a moral contour encapsulating an authentic view of the human
person).
181 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304 (holding that executions of mentally retarded
criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment).
182 Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun have favored abolitionist
positions throughout their dissents in various Supreme Court opinions. See supra
notes 60, 65-105 and accompanying text (discussing the abolitionist positions of the
three Justices as exemplified by their opinions in various death penalty cases). I
discuss the challenges for the abolitionist future in the next section.
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the complex labyrinth of legal, social, and behavioral issues that
yield capricious outcomes in death penalty cases.
The Atkins decision to ban further use of the death penalty
for mentally retarded offenders on the grounds of higher
threshold requirements for executions and preventing "special
risk of wrongful execution"'18 3 raised a host of issues. Jury
determinations of mental retardation call for a subjective
evaluation of a capital murder defendant's mental condition, as
well as the diagnostic process-a cascaded procedure fraught
with the possibility of distortion due to both interference from
Courts and legislatures, as well as the competency level used in
the actual diagnostic process. In reviewing competency levels
used in the actual diagnostic process, Professor Michael Perlin
wrote:
Anyone who has spent any time in the criminal justice systemas a defense lawyer, as a district attorney, or as a judge-knows
that our treatment of criminal defendants with mental
disabilities has been, forever, a scandal. Such defendants
receive substandard counsel, are treated poorly in prison,
receive disparately longer sentences, and are regularly coerced
into confessing
to crimes (many of which they did not
commit).1s4
While commenting on the coupling between criminal
culpability and mental capacity, he noted that "the scope and role
of the insanity defense ... is virtually irrelevant to this entire
conversation." 18 5 Atkins, therefore, invites us to consider how
testimony by mental health experts may affect the death
sentencing determinations.
If we are prohibited from executing mentally retarded
people, how does the Atkins decision affect capital defendants
with mental illness as debilitating as, or more incapacitating
then, mental retardation? Potential implications are boundless,
and, therefore, could lead to capricious outcomes in death
sentencing. For example, if people with borderline mental illness
183 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304-05 (showing that the Court's rationale for
banning the execution of mentally retarded criminals was based on the fact that
these criminals face "special risk[s] of wrongful execution," and that executing the
mentally retarded does not meet the threshold requirement of providing retribution
and deterrence for capital crimes).
184 Michael L. Perlin, Symposium, "Life Is in Mirrors, Death Disappears"Giving
Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 315, 315 (2003) (citations omitted).

185 Id.
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are placed in a prison system upon conviction, and are not

provided with adequate mental health resources, a condition is
created whereby the constellations of crowding, regimentation,
and a lack of mental health resources could contribute to fullIf now, by virtue of this
blown mental incapacitation.
impairment of the thought process, this mentally ill person
commits death penalty-eligible violence, can we execute him?
Are we, then, not acting against normative standards of fairness?
The Atkins decision confronts us with a poignant question:
where do we draw the line between mentally retarded and
mentally ill? The Court in Atkins held that the death penalty for
the mentally retarded does not serve any retributive or deterrent
interest.18 6 Should not the same, then, apply for mentally ill
If the answer is yes, the profound
murder defendants?
determination of who lives and who dies comes down to
subjective diagnoses by experts, and the jury instructions given
in a particular jurisdiction. Therefore, should we arrive at that
evolutionary moment in constitutional history where the
execution of the mentally ill becomes prohibited, we would still
be left with the confusing quagmire of separating those
defendants eligible for death from those who are ineligible. No
doubt, constitutional prohibition of executing mentally ill
murderers will allow us to sit on a moral high ground, but we
would still be left grappling with the capricious adjudication of
the death penalty. Therefore, I believe this issue will remain
despite the fact that the Court might provide us with the
psychiatric prescription and jury instructions relevant to a
determination of culpability.
As we ponder the potential ramifications of Atkins, we
cannot escape the reflective dimension of the encouraging
footnote attached to the Atkins opinion stating that, "within the
world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved." 18 7 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in
Atkins, further concluded: "Mentally retarded persons.., have
diminished capacities to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning....

186 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20.
187 Id. at 316-17 n.21.

Their deficiencies
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do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they
do diminish their personal culpability."' 88 If the diminished
culpability associated with mental retardation renders the death
penalty an excessive punishment, should not the people suffering
89
from serious mental illness also be exempt from execution?
18 Id. at 318.
189 While a clinical distinction exists between mental retardation and mental
illness, my conviction is that the Atkins ruling applies to the murderers suffering
from mental illness regardless of the scope of the insanity defense. For example, a
mentally ill person's delusional beliefs may cause them to engage in illogical
reasoning, and to act on impulse, which should reduce their threshold of culpability
for capital sentencing. Following the Atkins decision, a former President of the
American Psychiatric Association noted: "From a biopsychosocial perspective,
primary mental retardation and significant Axis I disorders have similar etiological
characteristics. And the mentally ill suffer from many of the same limitations that,
in Justice Stevens' words, 'do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but
they do diminish their personal culpability.'" Alan A. Stone, M.D., Supreme Court

Decision Raises New Ethical Questions for Psychiatry, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Vol. XIX,

Issue 9, September 2002, at 1 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318). The DSM-IV
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fourth Edition), published
by the American Psychiatric Association, operates a five-axis classification system.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,

DIAGNOSTIC AND

STATISTICAL MANUAL

OF MENTAL

DISORDERS 27 (4th ed. 2000). Clinical disorders are listed under Axis I. Id. The U.S.
Supreme Court majority in Atkins held that a part of the reason for prohibiting the
execution of offenders with mental retardation was that "in the aggregate [they] face
a special risk of wrongful execution." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. Here, the Court meant
not only that the particular vulnerabilities of such individuals placed them at
particular risk of wrongful conviction, but also of being sentenced to death when a
non-impaired individual might receive a life prison term. Id. at 320-21.The Court
felt:
The risk 'that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which
may call for a less severe penalty,' is enhanced, not only by the possibility
of false confessions, but also by the lesser ability of mentally retarded
defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face of
prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors. Mentally
retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their
counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes .... [Mioreover,
reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be 'atwo-edged
sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future
dangerousness will be found by the jury.
Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)). I am confident that most
people suffering from mental illness will never commit a violent crime while being
incarcerated with proper medical care. As a result, the constitutional ban on
execution, as in the case of individuals with mental retardation, must be extended
for people suffering from mental illness. I am also certain that a mentally ill
defendant who has committed a capital offense may be at a heightened and unfair
risk, as compared to defendants with no or lesser impairments, of receiving a death
sentence or in some cases being wrongfully convicted. Therefore, the Atkins and
Roper decisions again open up the issue of arbitrariness on the part of the death

612

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:561

Could the same benchmark be applicable to persons who lose
their sanity while laying in wait, entangled in the dehumanizing
environment of hopelessness, and ultimately lose their sanity to
the debilitating impairment called "Death Row Syndrome?" 190
penalty's diminished culpability doctrine. If the diminished culpability associated
with youth and mental retardation renders the death penalty an excessive
punishment when used against offenders from those categories, what about people
suffering from serious mental illness or impairment other than retardation, such as
serious brain damage at the time of the crime? Should they not also be ineligible for
execution? Justice Stevens, writing for the Supreme Court majority in Atkins,
concluded that:
Mentally retarded persons ...have diminished capacities to understand
and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and
learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses,
and to understand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that they
are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is
abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to
a premeditated plan ....Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption
from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.
Id. at 318. In a January 2006 report, Amnesty International observed that "[s]ome
judges in the USA have already recognized this fundamental inconsistency."
AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE EXECUTION OF MENTALLY ILL
OFFENDERS 11 (Jan. 2006), http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR510032006
ENGLISH/$File?AMR5100306.pdf. For example, the report chronicled how, in July
2003, Judge Robert Henry of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted the Atkins
ruling, and concluded that the execution of a mentally ill Oklahoma death row
inmate would contribute nothing to the goals of retribution and deterrence. Id. On a
similar note, the report discussed the 2002 dissent of Justice Robert Rucker of the
Indiana Supreme Court in the case of Joseph Corcoran, an inmate suffering from
mental illness. Id. Justice Rucker drew attention to the Atkins decision:
I respectfully dissent because I do not believe a sentence of death is
appropriate for a person suffering a severe mental illness. Recently the
Supreme Court held that the executions of mentally retarded criminals are
"cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. There has been no argument in this case
that Corcoran is mentally retarded. However, the underlying rationale for
prohibiting executions of the mentally retarded is just as compelling for
prohibiting executions of the seriously mentally ill, namely evolving
standards of decency.
Id. (quoting Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, J.,
dissenting).
190 According to Wikipeda, "[t]he death row phenomenon, also known as the
death row syndrome, is a term used to refer to the emotional distress felt by
prisoners on death row, as a social phenomenon." Wikipedia.org, Death Row
Phenomenon, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death-row-phenomenon (last visited Aug.
25, 2006). The phenomenon has been described as the result of living on death row
for an extened time. Id. It is documenated in the U.S. that the typical death row
inmate spends about a decade awaiting execution, with some inmates having spent
over twenty years on death row. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, TIME
ON DEATH Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397 (last visited
Aug. 25, 2006). The effects of this long time and arduous confinement create a
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Often times, death row inmates drop their appeals and consent to
their own execution, as they succumb to the horrifying specter of
their impending lethal conclusion. 191
Sometimes these
condemned persons find themselves on death row for a long time
while the appellate processes labor on knowing fully well the sole
object for preserving life is to terminate it, at the time of the
State's choosing.
While they live under the Sword of
Damocles, 192 each becomes a "Dead Man Walking" 193 as their

breeding ground for "delusions and suicidal tendencies in an individual and can
cause insanity in a form that is dangerous." Wikipedia.org, supra. As death row
prisoners are generally isolated from other prisoners, death row prisoners do not
participate in educational and employment programs, have severe restrictions on
their visitation and exercise privileges, and typically spend twenty-three hours a day
alone in their cells. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra. In 2005, The
United Nations Commission on Human Rights considered the conditions on death
row, and the phenomenon of being a death row inmate:
The notion of "death row phenomenon" indicates the conditions of detention
of a person condemned to capital punishment while awaiting the execution
of the sentence. Those conditions of detention-which can include such
factors as the very long duration of detention, total or near-total isolation in
individual cells, the uncertainty of the moment of the execution, and
deprivation of contacts with the outside world, including family members
and legal counsel-often amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Question of the Death Penalty, Item 17 of Draft Agenda, Promotionand Protection of
Human Rights, (United Nations Comm'n On Human Rights, 61st Session), July 4,
2005, available at http://www.fidh.org/article.php3?id-article=2373. Further, the
United States Supreme Court considered Death Row Syndrome in Solesbee v.
Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), when, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter
stated that the "onset of insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not
a rare phenomenon." Id. at 14 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Moreover, since 1995,
both Justices Stephen Breyer and John Paul Stevens have questioned the length of
time spent on death row. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra. Justice
Stevens addressed the issue in 1995 by writing on a Texas case involving a man who
spent seventeen years on death row. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045
(1995). Justice Stevens wrote that the Courts should act as 'laboratories" for
examining whether executing inmates after extended time on death row could
violate the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 1047. In 1999, Justice Breyer stated, "It is
difficult to deny the suffering inherent in a prolonged wait for execution...."
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Moore v.
Nebraska, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). He was the dissenting
voice for the Court's decision not to hear the appeals of two inmates. The first spent
nearly twenty-five years on Florida's death row, Knight, 528 U.S. at 994, and the
latter, a Nebraska prisoner, spent nearly twenty years on death row. Id.
191 See, e.g., DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 190 (noting that
Michael Ross, a death row inmate in New England, waived his appeals, and
accepted his execution).
192 A popular Greek tale, the Sword of Damocles, is often described as a
philosophical tale with a hidden meaning similar to that of the common English
quote "walk a mile in my shoes." See, e.g., Ancienthistory.about.com, Sword of
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lives continue to sway under the pendulum of glimmering hope
and impending death. Would not this tortuous existence fall
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause? Where are
the "evolving standards of decency" 194 in executing people who
have gone insane under the traumatic and dehumanizing
experience of death row?
The history of U.S. capital

Damocles, http://ancienthistory.about.com/od/ciceroworkslatin/ffDamoclesSword.htm
(last visited Aug. 25, 2006) (describing the Sword of Damocles as a philosophical
writing which almost translates into the idiom of "walk a mile in my shoes").
However, the English saying lacks the intense bite found in the story of the Sword of
Damocles. A simple scan of the local library shelves or a cursory internet search will
turn up numerous results for this popular story. However, for the ease of the reader,
I provide the following translation of the Sword of Damocles:
Dionysius was a fourth century B.C. tyrant of Syracuse. To all appearances
he was very rich and comfortable, with all the luxuries money could buy,
tasteful clothing and jewelry, and delectable food. He even had court
flatterers (adsentatores)to inflate his ego. One of these ingratiators was the
court sycophant Damocles. Damocles used to make comments to the king
about his wealth and luxurious life. One day when Damocles complimented
the tyrant on his abundance and power, Dionysius turned to Damocles and
said, "If you think I'm so lucky, how would you like to try out my life?"
Damocles readily agreed, and so Dionysius ordered everything to be
prepared for Damocles ....Damocles was enjoying himself immensely
until he noticed a sharp sword hovering over his head, which was
suspended from the ceiling by a horse hair. This, the tyrant explained to
Damocles, was what life as ruler was really like. Damocles alarmed and
quickly revising his idea of what made up a good life, asked to be excused.
He then eagerly returned to his poorer, but safer life.
Id. (emphasis added). This story is a metaphoric glance at the life of the death row
inmate. He is constantly aware of the sword dangling above his head-the
impending execution.
193 Consider a "Dead Man Walking":
The clank announces the opening of the iron cell door. The man steps out.
For 13-years he has remained isolated on death row. The air is dry. He is
emotionally dead. He is only a body, a space. He walks. Step-by-step. His
appointment date has arrived. Numbed, he surrenders his body to the
crucifix-shaped bed. His arms outstretched. Blankly he stares. Watching
the death routine unfold. Fellow humans beings, his executioners insert
needles into his veins. The death drugs will follow. He may eek out some
last words, or he may remain silent. After all, he is a dead man walking.
This is an interpretive depiction of the final moments of a dead man walking. This is
the experience of many death row inmates on their final walk towards execution.
The phrase "Dead Man Walking" has also become popularized because these are
words that that guards at San Quentin Prison are said to have yelled when deathrow inmates were let out of their cells. Additionally, the phrase "Dead Man Walking"
has become famous because of the book and movie based on the real life of Sister
Helen Prejean, a Catholic Sister of St. Joseph of Medaille Order.
194 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).

20061

POST-ROPER CAPITAL JURISPRUDENCE

jurisprudence in determining competency for execution is
scandalous at worst, minimally instructive at best.
Though the Supreme Court has provided some constitutional
protections against the death penalty on account of mental
impairment, these protections have limited or no effect for people
who were sane at the time of the crime, trial, conviction, and
sentence, but have developed severe mental illness during
incarceration. In 1986, the petitioner, Alvin Ford, in Ford v.
Wainwright,195 challenged the Supreme Court to determine
whether a maturing civilized society can carry out the execution
knowing that the person being executed no longer comprehends
what is going to happen, or why it is going to happen. 196 The
Ford majority, while taking into account "objective evidence of
contemporary values before determining whether a particular
punishment comports with the fundamental human dignity that
the Amendment protects,"' 97 failed to provide us with any
objective guidance regarding competency for execution. While
Justice Marshall recognized the severe limitations in the State's
procedure to provide an objective review of the death row
inmates' mental state, 98 Justice Powell attempted to provide the
competency criteria by suggesting that the test should be
whether the prisoner is aware of both his or her impending
execution and the reason for it.' 99 To him, therefore, the issue of
Ford's claim warrants an answer "not whether, but when, his
execution may take place,"2 0 0 as he asserted that, "if petitioner is
cured of his disease, the State is free to execute him." 20 '
Two decades later, the State of California took Justice
Powell's guidance in Ford and ran with it, as it executed seventysix year old Clarence Ray Allen, California's oldest inmate on

195 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
196 See id. at 401-05 (showing that the case involved the need to resolve the

issue of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of the insane, even if
the person became insane after his or her incarceration).
197 Id. at 406.
198 See id. at 415 (recognizing that there could be no objective review of a death
row inmates' mental state because of Florida's procedure of denying any opportunity
to challenge the state-appointed psychiatrists' opinions).
199 See id. at 421 (arguing that one of the death penalty's critical justificationsits retributive force-depends on the defendant's awareness of the penalty's
existence and purpose).
200 Id. at 425.
201 Id. at 425 n.5.
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death row. 20 2 Allen was blind, confined to a wheelchair, suffered
from diabetes, and had a nearly fatal heart attack four months
before his execution date in January of 2006.203 His case was
fraught with the hallmark capriciousness that often surrounds
the death penalty, such as the testimony of unreliable informant
witnesses, perceived racial bias, and critical errors by the "trial
court, prosecutor, and defense counsel." 20 4 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in an opinion denying relief, shed light this
way: "Trial counsel admits he did nothing to prepare for the
penalty phase until after the guilty verdicts were rendered, and
even then, in what little time was available, he failed sufficiently
to investigate and adequately present available mitigating
evidence." 20 5 By medically reviving Allen after his earlier heart
attack and then introducing a lethal injection into his veins four
months later, 20 6 the State of California raised the issue of
morality of vengeance that penetrates deep into the ethical fibers
of the U.S. Constitution. If a civilized nation permits planned
and calculated termination of life, does it have any "standards of
decency" 20 7 left to continue to stake claim as a "maturing
society?" 208 Are these flagrant transgressions of humanitarian
principles simply the last vestige of frontier mentalities of a
bygone generation? Or, do these barbaric executions echo the
historical background and ethos of a constitution grappling to
20 9
come to terms with the "evolving standards of decency?"
Despite the disastrous outcome, the moral contour of the
Supreme Court remained intact, albeit barely, by the dissent of
Justice Breyer in the Court's denial of the petition for the writ of
certiorari, when he stated that, "I believe that in the
circumstances he raises a significant question as to whether his

202 See Senior Prisoner on California'sDeath Row Is Executed at Age 76, WASH.
POST, Jan. 18, 2006, at A02.
203 See National Coalition To Abolish the Death Penalty, Do Not Execute
Clarence Ray Allen!, http://www.democracyinaction.orgtdia/organizations/ncadp/
campaign.jsp?campaign_KEY=1735 (last visited Aug. 25, 2006).
204 Death Penalty Focus, Clarence Ray Allen, http://www.deathpenalty.org/pdf_
files/ClarenceRayAllen.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2006).
205 Id.
206 See 76-Year-Old Man Executed, ADVERTISER, Jan. 18, 2006, at 32.
207 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
208 Id.
209

Id.
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execution would constitute 'cruel and unusual punishment' [in
violation of the Eighth Amendment] .,210
Between Alvin Ford and Clarence Ray Allen, there was a
twenty-year journey to decide the level of competence required
before one is executed.
Ford's challenge to ensure greater
protection for the seriously mentally ill in capital jurisprudence
remained unanswered in Allen. As the deadly cocktail of racial
disparity, inadequate counsel, and prosecutorial misconduct
continues to interject lethal consequences for mentally
incapacitated prisoners, such deaths have never been so uniquely
degrading to human dignity as they are in the case of mentally ill
foreign nationals. 211 Mr. Syed Rabbani was a twenty-one year
old student from Bangladesh when he was charged in Texas for
killing a fellow foreign national in 1986.212 Besides the serious
reservations regarding the quality of his representation, whether
or not the arresting authorities properly notified him of his right
to communicate with his consular representative is hazy at
best.2 13 Moving beyond the procedural issues heavily skewed

210 Allen v. Ornoski, No. 05-8639 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/Ol1606pzr.pdf (last visited Aug.
30, 2006).
211 The execution of foreign nationals has not received much attention because
of the unfavorable light in which they are perceived as non-citizens. Additionally,
the literature is rather limited on this issue despite the fact that foreign nationals
face more hurdles due to their different backgrounds and the language and culture
barriers that exist. See Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations: A Search for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 606
(1997) ("[B]ecause of culture, language barriers, and the inability to obtain evidence,
a foreign national is inherently prejudiced ...in a foreign criminal justice system.").
See generally John Quigley, Execution of Foreign Nationals in the United States:
Pressure from Foreign Governments Against the Death Penalty, 4 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 589 (1998) (discussing the execution of foreign nationals in the United
States).
212 See Kathy Fair, Death Row Inmate Threatens Suicide, HOUS. CHRON., July
28, 1988, at 123. According to staff writer Kathy Fair, "Rabbani, 23, [1 came to the
United States in 1984 on a student visa." Id.; see also Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Syed Mohmed Rabbani (describing Rabbani's crime), http://www.
tdcj.state.tx.us/statistics/deathrow/drowlist/rabbani.jpg (last visited Aug. 30, 2006).
The Texas Department of Criminal Justice maintains a list of all death row inmates.
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 391 Offenders are Currently on Death Row,
http://www.tdjc.state.tx.us/stat/offendersondrow.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2006).
213 See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Consular
Notification and Access, Part 2: Detailed Instructions (explaining the rights of a
foreign national when detained in the United States), http://travel.state.gov/
law/consular/consular 747.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2006). "Whenever a foreign
national is arrested or detained in the United States, there are legal requirements to
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against the poor, immature, and non-native English-speaking
foreign national, Rabbani's mental health needs to be considered
as he is now in the psychiatric unit of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice's death row. 2 14 The legitimacy of his mental
illness is beyond doubt, as even a federal judge noted that
"Rabbani's apparent deranged mental state '[is] evidenced by his
prior litigation history, along with his status as a death row
inmate.' ' 215
Rabbani's case invites us to take a deep,
introspective, look at the complex tapestry of constitutional
protection against Due Process violations and cruel and unusual
punishment, deficient judicial construction to guarantee greater
protection against the "special risk of wrongful execution," 2 16 and
the Eighth Amendment's insurance of greater scrutiny of the
offender's background.
Rabbani developed a serious mental
impairment during the excruciating interval between his
sentencing and execution. The impairment was exacerbated by
ensure that the foreign national's government can offer him/her appropriate
consular assistance." Id. The mandatory nature of such notice depends upon one's
country of origin, and a Bangladeshi citizen may receive the following notification:
As a non-U.S. citizen who is being arrested or detained, you are entitled to
have us notify your country's consular officers here in the United States of
your situation. You are also entitled to communicate with your consular
officers. A consular officer may be able to help you obtain legal
representation, and may contact your family and visit you in detention,
among other things. If you want us to notify your consular officers, you can
request this notification now, or at any time in the future. Do you want us
to notify your consular officers at this time. [sic]
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Consular Notification and
Access, Part 4: Translations, http://travel.state.govlaw/consular/consular_749.html
(last visited Aug. 30, 2006). Questions arise as to whether or not Rabbani received
proper notification of his right to speak with a consular representative.
214 Syed Rabbani is currently housed at the Jester IV Psychiatric Facility in
Fort Bend County. Inmate status, including current physical location, can be
confirmed by contacting Jester IV, Richmond, Texas 77469-8549 at (281) 277-3700.
The Jester IV (J4) Psychiatric Facility is described as, "Custody Levels Housed: All
levels requiring psychiatric treatment." Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Unit
Directory, Jester
IV
Psychiatric
Facility,
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/statl
unitdirectory/j4.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2006).
215 Rosanna Ruiz, Lawsuits Out of This World, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 24, 2003, at
A15.
216 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). The Courts have noted in cases
like Atkins and Roper that heightened protection is needed for mentally ill and
juvenile offenders because they are less able to comprehend their crimes, and,
therefore, face an increased risk of wrongful convictions and unjustified death
sentences. I have noted that foreign nationals like Rabbani, because of their reduced
comprehension of the U.S. language, culture, and particularly, the legal system, also
face a heightened risk of wrongful convictions and unjustified death sentences.
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the encompassing environment of an alien culture, his constant
brooding over his fate, and his inability to comprehend the
2 17
appellate procedure because of a debilitating language barrier.
In light of the murky history, including Alvin Ford and Clarence
Ray Allen, what fate do we impose on Syed Rabbani? Do we
apply Justice Powell's prescription of waiting to cure Rabbani to
then execute him,218 or do we take guidance from Justice Breyer's
ruling in an unrelated case in which he believed that such a
situation warranted a commutation of the death sentence
because anything else would be a flagrant violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment? In
the absence of credible objective standards to guide us, and in
light of voluminous evidence corroborating the existence of an
inconsistency of death sentences, I would argue the Supreme
Court must now step forward to lay another layer of prohibitions
against death penalty sentences for the mentally ill, including
those diagnosed with mental illness anytime during the process
between the commission of a crime and execution.
V.

CHALLENGES TO MORAL CONSISTENCY: THE OBSTACLE
COURSE FOR THE COURT

Three decades ago, when the U.S. Supreme Court reinstated
the death penalty in Gregg, it did so with the premise that
"contemporary standards of decency" 21 9 in the U.S. had not
matured enough to warrant the death penalty, per se,
unconstitutional. 220 By removing mentally retarded individuals
and juveniles from the overarching tentacles of capital
punishment, the Court signaled various themes. First, implicit
217 Telephone Interview with Prison Secretary, Chester IV, in Richmond, Tex.
(Feb. 1, 2006) (on file with author). His English comprehension is quite fuzzy, as
noted by a Jester IV secretary in a personal telephone conversation regarding
Rabbani's telephone and letter writing privileges. One conversation resulted in the
secretary stating, "I don't know think [sic] he can read English very well, someone
could just read his letters to him." Id. His English comprehension is quite fuzzy.
Syed Rabbani's native language is Bengali. He was raised in Dhaka, Bangladesh
and studied until the 12th grade. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Syed
Mohmed Rabbani, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/statistics/deathrow/drowlist/rabbani.
jpg (last visited Aug. 30, 2006).
218 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 418-27 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)
(implying that a mentally incompetent criminal cannot be executed until cured of his
mental infirmity).
219 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 155 (1976).
220 See id. at 179.
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in the Court's conclusion is the recognition that "contemporary
standards of decency" 221 have evolved in the thirty years since it
decided Gregg.22 2 Second, by its own admission in Roper, the
Court is willing to impose the moral judgment of the judiciary on
the people of the land. 223 Third, the Court emphasized its
willingness to impose a more heightened measure of culpability
for determining death eligibility. 224 These all are reasons for an
abolitionist outcome at the end of the Supreme Court death
penalty jurisprudence's evolutionary process.
The reality,
however, is different as the Supreme Court faces significant
challenges on a number of fronts.
First, the benchmark the Court established in Roper for a
national consensus test called for the determination of a
"consistency of ...change," 225 a rather vague criterion that can
either be easily manipulated or strictly interpreted to fit the
retentionist outcome in any specific class of death penalty.
Though the Court advocated a national consensus test, it is no
substitute for the awesome duty vested in the Court to interpret
the Constitution and to uphold its provisions. When it comes to
the issue of death, the most extreme and irrevocable form of
punishment, the Court in no way must waver from its duty to act
as an independent arbiter, nor should it adjudicate constitutional
issues with fear or on the basis of finding favor with the public.
Almost a century back, in Weems v. United States,226 the Court
held that the provision of the Constitution was "not fastened to
the obsolete," but might "acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice." 227 Justice Jackson, in
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,228 echoed similar
sentiments:

Id. at 155.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005) (illustrating the evolving
standards of decency by recapping state legislative activity pertaining to capital
punishment).
223 See id. at 563-64 ("[lIn the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on
the question of the acceptability of the death penalty ....).
224 See id. at 568 (limiting capital punishment to those offenders whose extreme
culpability makes them "the most deserving of execution") (citation omitted).
225 Id. at 566.
226 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
227 Id. at 378.
228 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
221

222
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The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
229
outcome of no elections.
Therefore, I argue the right to human life is so sacred, and
the inherent dignity of human beings so inviolable, that the issue
of the constitutionality of capital punishment cannot be referred
to an opinion poll in which a majority would surely prevail over
the wishes of the minority-the condemned murderers. Justice
Powell was correct in his Furman dissent when he expressed his
belief that the "amorphous ebb and flow of public opinion" 230 on
the significantly volatile issue of death "lies at the periphery231
not the core-of the judicial process in constitutional cases."
Chief Justice Wright, speaking for the Supreme Court of
California, succinctly summarized this notion:
Public acceptance of capital punishment is a relevant but not
controlling factor in assessing whether it is consonant with
contemporary standards of decency. But public acceptance
cannot be measured by the existence of death penalty statutes
or by the fact that some juries impose death on criminal
defendants. Nor are public opinion polls about a process which
is far removed from the experience of those responding helpful
in determining whether capital punishment would be acceptable
to an informed public were it even-handedly applied to a
substantial proportion of the persons potentially subject to
execution.232
The second issue the Court must overcome is the rejection,
by scholars, of the Justices' practice of taking the lead in
establishing the moral norms governing society. 233 The Court's
leadership in
melding society's morality with domestic
Id. at 638.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 443 (per curiam) (Powell, J., dissenting).
231 Id.
232 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 893-94 (Cal. 1972).
233 A growing number of scholars have rejected the idea of Supreme Court
Justices becoming the moral arbiters of society's values. In this context, I refer to the
excellent commentary provided to me by Professor Rob Vischer during the St. John's
Law School Symposium: The Jurisprudential Legacy of Pope John Paul II, March
24-25, 2006, New York City.
229
230
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jurisprudence, as shown in Roper and Atkins, should not be
misconstrued as the Courts' overarching reach in controlling all
aspects of moral discourse within the society. We must recognize
both that the death penalty is unique, and that implicitly
embedded within the confines of the Constitution are values of a
more mature society, which can evolve via moral contour
formation in our jurisprudential discourse. In this context,
Justice Stewart's comment in Furman warrants repetition:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total
irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of
the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is
unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is
234
embodied in our concept of humanity.
Judicial process cannot operate in an ethical vacuum, nor
can the legal methods be devoid of morality-laden value
judgments. We cannot deny that the Supreme Court is the Court
of final adjudication over all matters pertaining to the
interpretation of constitutional text, protection of minorities, and
enforcement of constitutional safeguards. Therefore, inherent in
this adjudication process is the promise of extra-legal
considerations, albeit within a legal framework that starts with
law and ends with law. This discourse also entails giving
broader discretion to the Supreme Court Justices in settling the
most significant of all disputes; namely, the question of under
what circumstances a fellow human in society forfeits his or her
right to life. In a climate where the value of life and human
dignity have been demeaned, I do not hesitate in having an
ethically enlightened and morally empowered Supreme Court to
take us to an abolitionist future, even at the expense of the
remote possibility of letting them encroach into other areas of
moral discourse. Almost a century back, Prime Minister Winston
Churchill captured it best, while speaking in the House of
Commons:
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of
crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the
civilisation [sic] of any country. A calm and dispassionate
recognition of the rights of the accused against the State, and
even of convicted criminals against the State, a constant heart-

234

Furman,408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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searching by all charged with the duty of punishment, a desire
and eagerness to rehabilitate in the world of industry all those
who have paid their dues in the hard coinage of punishment,
tireless efforts towards the discovery of curative and
regenerating processes, and an unfaltering faith that there is a
treasure, if you can only find it, in the heart of every manthese are the symbols which in the treatment of crime and
criminals mark and measure the stored-up strength of a nation,
235
and are the sign and proof of the living virtue in it.

As the public perceptions of morality of execution and the
evolving Supreme Court capital jurisprudence accelerate towards
a collision course, we are confronted with the challenge to seek a
robust framework to position the issue of the death penalty.
What would that framework be? Is it even possible to develop
such framework? Could the debate on the death penalty be
sustained through this framework? 236 I believe this framework
revolves around a concerted effort to trace a moral contour
around what it means to be human. 237 As we fully comprehend
the most authentic version of what it means to be human, we will
be able to encapsulate the inherent dignity of such human
persons. Therefore, the measure of human dignity manifests
238
itself in a comprehensive understanding of its inviolability,
235 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, ADDRESS TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, ON THE
SUBJECT OF DOMESTIC AFFAIRS (July 20, 1910), reprinted in WINSTON CHURCHILL:
HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, 1598 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974). A
former Prime Minister of England, Winston Churchill (1874-1965), in this famous
speech in the House of Commons on July 20, 1910, detailed his personal beliefs
relating to crime and the treatment of criminals in society. This philosophy was
witnessed many years later in his important role in the development of the
European Convention on Human Rights.
236 Professor Richard Garnett posed this challenge in his work, Christian
Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the Death Penalty. See Richard Garnett, Christian
Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the Death Penalty, in RELIGION AND THE DEATH
PENALTY: A CALL FOR RECKONING (Owens et al. eds., 2004) (attempting to set a
framework in which to analyze capital punishment), available at http://www.law.nd.
edulfaculty/facultypages/garnettr/Garnett Call for ReckoningChap.%208.pdf.
237 See generally Rev. John J. Coughlin, Law and Theology: Reflections on What
It Means To Be Human from a FranciscanPerspective, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 609
(2000) (exploring the anthropological question of what it means to be a human
being).
238 The central theme on which the right to life for all humans stands, I will
argue, is the inviolability of a human person. The concept that every person has the
right to life can evolve in various forms. For example, what does it mean that every
person shall have the right to life? What is a "person"? When does "personhood" and
life initiate? Can a human person ever forfeit the right to life? The answers to all
such queries can be encapsulated by extracting the inviolability of the human person
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which in turn allows us to make a value judgment on the issues
of forfeiture. When does the human forfeit inherent dignity? Or,
does the human ever forfeit human dignity? If ever, it depends
in part on an understanding of the human person, and in part
through an estimation of inherent dignity. 239

within the intersection of moral and jurisprudential discourse. I will argue that
every person has the right to life and, therefore, that right is inviolable. Judicial
extrapolation of this issue, then, invalidates all capital punishment, an outcome with
which both the judiciary and legislators have yet to come to grip. In this context,
Michael Perry notes, "Indeed, the proposition that every human being is inviolable
(or some functionally equivalent proposition) is axiomatic for so many secular
moralities that many secular moral philosophers have come to speak of 'the moral
point of view' as that view according to which 'every person [has] some sort of equal
status.'" Perry, supra note 38, at 45-46 (quoting JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS
MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 239 (1986)). According to the
Gospel Vision, the answer to the above query is: "Each and every other human
being, because each and every other human being is a child of God and a
sister/brother to oneself." Id. at 44 n.76. This then results in the outcome according
to Perry, "[n]o life better befits us as God's children, no life better fulfills us as
beings created as God has created us, than to 'love one another.'" Id. at 44-45 n.76.
John Paul II writes, "there arise at the same time the fundamental questions which
pervade human life: Who am I? Where have I come from and where am I
going?... [W]e find them in the writings of Confucius and Lao-Tze, and in the
preaching of Tirthankara and Buddha .... They are questions which have their
common source in the quest for meaning which has always compelled the human
heart." Id. at 50 n.88 (quoting JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER FIDES ET RATIO
1 (1998) (emphasis omitted)).
239 Inherent dignity is, in my mind, the life force of making the human person
inviolable. Throughought the text, I refer to the scope and meaning of inherent
human dignity. There is an established belief within the Catholic Church on the
inherent dignity of humanity. This very belief was reaffirmed by a group of U.S.
Catholic Bishops from the south when they stated:
As pastoral leaders of the Roman Catholic community, we continue to
reflect with you on the themes of responsibility, rehabilitation and
restoration in light of the reality of crime and criminal justice in our area of
the country ....
... [P]risons have failed to respect the fundamental human dignity of
every prisoner ....
We recognize the fundamental human dignity of prisoners and are
troubled
by
the
documented
level
of
violence
against
prisoners... Prisoners are persons, with inherent God-given human
dignity. When prisoners become units from which profit is derived, there is
a tendency to see them as commodities rather than as children of God. Our
troubled times have taught us that, once people are dehumanized, they are
more liable to be exploited, abused and violated and to becoming more
violent themselves.
To deprive other persons of their freedom, to restrict them from
contact with other human beings, to use force against them up to and

2006]

POST-ROPER CAPITAL JURISPRUDENCE

625

The history of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence traced the
development of a hierarchical threshold level of criminal
culpability, based on which punishment of life and where death
falls. This difference is in quantum, and gives rise to a very
narrow meaning of human dignity, and it invites a plethora of
question that requires delving into our contemporary moral
discourse.
Does that mean those human beings that are
immunized from death in both Roper and Atkins have more
human dignity, and therefore greater value as humans, than
those who fall outside the Roper and Atkins framework? Could
this also mean a human person in the Roper or Atkins sense is
more inviolable, and thus may never forfeit his or her life, while
those who fall outside the spectrum do forfeit their life? Does
that also mean that human dignity has a hierarchical value
structure that can be assigned in accordance to the threshold of
criminal culpability adjudicated by a jury or judge? These
questions clearly indicate that contemporary society's current
understanding of the human person and his inherent dignity fall
flat against a robust value-centric argument. By this same line
of reasoning, we cannot associate a human person with the
punishment of execution because, if we do so, we will
undoubtedly apply the penalty inconsistently regardless of the
jurisprudential safeguards. This, then, leads me to conclude that
these are the objective issues we must incorporate in developing
including deadly force, are the most serious of acts ....
... [There is] the need for our prisons to respect the human dignity of
each and every person ....
... Independent monitors should be allowed to make sure that private
prisons are operating in ways that treat all concerned, including prisoners,
with the dignity that is inherent in all human beings.
CATHOLIC BISHOPS OF THE SOUTH, PASTORAL STATEMENT, WARDENS FROM WALL
STREET.
PRISON
PRIVATIZATION,
http://www.restorejustice.comfiles/whtis_

sobishopsrJ2.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2006). Proceeding further on the topic of
inherent dignity, the University of San Diego Department of Ethnic Studies has
within its program the Catholic Social Teachings. The Catholic Social Teachings
overview on the area of Dignity of the Human Person states:
I. There is inherent dignity in the human person because all people are
created in the image of God.
II. Human dignity exists as a result of our existence. It is not dependent
upon social conditions, race, class, gender, sexuality-it is not earned or
achieved-it provides a unique social worth that exist [sic] in each person
simply because they exist. Therefore, all human life is sacred.
III. The human person is the starting point for a moral vision of society.
Univ. San Diego, Dep't Ethnic Studies, Catholic Social Teaching, http://www.
sandiego.edu/es/socialteaching.php (last visited August 30, 2006).
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a framework to define the authenticated human person, who is
inviolable by death, infinitely estimable with inherent dignity,
and for whom the forfeiture of life is not an option.
The vision of the human person enumerated here does not
comport with a justice mechanism fraught with the randomness
and arbitrariness of the death penalty. Justice Brennan, in
Furman,echoed this sentiment:
The true significance of these punishments is that they treat
members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be
toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the
fundamental premise of the Clause that even the vilest criminal
240
remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.
Finally, as we seek a full conceptualization of an authentic
human person amidst a multitude of complexities, we are
reminded of what John Paul II has called the "moral truth about
the human person." 24 1 As we ponder over the interaction of
dignity, destiny, and the destructive possibility of the human
person, we seek to correct our moral compass by trying to
242
comprehend the "inviolable mystery of the [human] person."
Why is this important in our discourse? Because, the debate over
the death penalty must fully comprehend the dignity and destiny
of the human person, which remains incomplete without
appreciating that every human being, from the mentally retarded
to mentally incapacitated, from a convicted murderer to a child
rapist, every single one of them is "'the noblest work of G[od]'-243
infinitely valuable, relentlessly unique, endlessly interesting."
How is it possible, a child rapist? Convicted murderer? The
answer to these questions, I do not know. But, this much I do
Somewhere in the infinite, inestimable process of
know.
creation, something snapped, and something went haywire. As a
result, we see the transformation of the noblest creation of God
240 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272-73 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).

241 JOHN PAUL

II,

AD LIMINA ADDRESS TO THE BISHOPS OF TEXAS, OKLAHOMA,

AND ARKANSAS TEACHERS OF MORAL TRUTH 3, reprinted in ORIGINS, Oct. 1, 1998,
at 282, 283.
242 Letter from Cardinal Wojtyla to Henri de Lubac, quoted in George Weigel,
John Paul II and the Crisis of Humanism, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 1999, at 31-36, in
THE SECOND ONE THOUSAND YEARS: TEN PEOPLE WHO DEFINED A MILLENNIUM 116

(Richard John Neuhaus ed., 2001).
243 Thomas L. Shaffer, Human Nature and Moral Responsibility in LawyerClient Relationships, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 2 (1995) (quoting Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. 419, 463 (1793).
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who becomes a child rapist or a murderer. Should we then
exterminate his life? Will state-sanctioned killing fulfill the
societal objectives? The answer in the affirmative will require us
to accept our existence as humans within a narrow quantum of
time. It will require us to estimate the worthiness of a human
life with a restricted vision of the universe. That, surely, is not
the answer we are seeking as humans, nor is it the destination
our civilization wants to proceed towards. As stated by Nobel
Laureate Tagore:
Life is perpetually creative because it contains in itself that
surplus which ever overflows the boundaries of the immediate
time and space, restlessly pursuing its adventure of expression
in the varied forms of self-realization.
.... Born in this great world, full of the mystery of the infinite,
we cannot accept our existence as a momentary outburst of
chance drifting on the current of matter toward an eternal
244
nowhere.
Therefore, I would argue that the ethical vision that guided
the Supreme Court in its journey from Furman to Roper is
seeking this same philosophical vision of the human person that
is at the core of the Papal philosophy of the late Cardinal Karol
Wojtyla.
I began this monograph with an inquiry as to whether the
overlap between the Papal jurisprudence and the general
abolitionist position had a deeply rooted alignment.
After
carefully parsing through a series of Supreme Court decisions, a
plethora of illuminated judicial opinions, and a litany of scholar's
views, I am convinced that any apparent overlap is purely
coincidental. On the other hand, the nature of this alignment
gives currency to the general conclusion that a civilized society
must do away with the machinery of death under all
circumstances.

244 Selected Quotations of Rabindranath Tagore, http://www.schoolofwisdom.
comtagorequotes.html (last visited August 20, 2006). Rabindranath Tagore was
born in Calcutta, India on May 7, 1861. A Nobel Laureate in poetry, Rabindranath
Tagore was a proud Ambassador of Indian culture. He is well known for his poetry,
but also flourished in philosophy, novels, and painting. He was a social activist,
humanitarian, and Indian patriot. The national anthems for both India and
Bangladesh are his creations.
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CONCLUSION

This article expresses my conviction that capital punishment
is qualitatively different from other punishments and is not
consistent with the present maturity of our civilization. Further,
the deliberate termination of the life of a person, systematically
planned by the governmental machinery, is a punishment
unjustifiable under any circumstances within the current
modalities of our contemporary society.
I arrive at this
conclusion after carefully evaluating all possible social objectives
for the imposition of such a mode of punishment and, therefore,
hold the view that the U.S. Supreme Court should extend its
categorical ban on capital punishment beyond the class of
murderers it characterized in its decision in Atkins and Roper.
My current inquiry seeking a trajectory of consistent
jurisprudence and moral vision in the Court's legal discourse is
prompted by two significant philosophical shifts-our judiciary's
recognition of an increased threshold for capital punishment, and
the Catholic teaching embedded in the moral vision of an
enhanced value for the human person. While both advocate a
greater emphasis on the dignity of man, I do not see any causal
relationship between the two viewpoints, albeit each one's stance
lends credence to the others. On the issue of the consistency of
Supreme Court capital jurisprudence, my conclusion is two-fold.
A review of the history of significant cases, and the opinions
of the Justices therein, shows that each time the Court
recognized and embarked on a corrective course of action, the
outcome either opened up to more complexities or it was never
able to overcome the capricious application identified by the
Furman Court. It is my opinion that, despite its best efforts, it is
extremely difficult to prevent random application of the death
penalty and my analysis above supports it. Therefore, a rational
and judicial analysis supports the conjecture that the innocent
and less culpable have been executed, and will continue to be
executed, and does not require the explicit proof via statistical
measures. On this argument alone, the death penalty remains
an impermissibly cruel invasion of the right to life, the protection
of which is fundamental to the maturing process of our society.
My examination of several Supreme Court opinions during
the Court's storied journey from Furman to Roper reveals the
judiciary's recognition of a moral contour that the legal discourse
must follow. Driven by an implicit fidelity to the indeterminate
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texts of the Constitution and an awareness of the citizenry's
belief in 18th century frontier jurisprudence, perhaps the Court
lost its moral compass. In the long run, however, the Court has
shown its commitment to steadying the moral compass, which
signals a siren call for hope, for the better understanding of the
human person.
Implicit within the Court's moral contour formation, I see a
promise to seek a fuller understanding of personhood. However,
the Court must extricate itself from the frozen inequalities of the
two hundred year old Constitution and imbibe within its ethos a
renewed understanding of the human being. This understanding
is enshrined in the inviolability of life, a life that can never be
taken away under any pretext of constitutionality. This, then,
forms the backbone of the framework on which the death penalty
debate must rise or fall, and along the way allows the Court to
overcome the societal and citizenry challenges I have previously
discussed.
I close with hope. Hope from what I see in the Supreme
Court's bold step in Roper, hope from what I see in the Vatican's
vision of the human person. And, it is with the same hope that I
am waiting for an abolitionist future that sits lurking in a tunnel
of despair, the tunnel that subsumes the languishing moans of
countless men and women waiting on death row. Some innocent,
some not innocent, but all born with the inviolable human
dignity, human dignity that the 20th century legal scholar,
Clarence Darrow, invoked in his plea for life: "I am pleading for
the future; I am pleading for a time when hatred and cruelty will
not control the hearts of men, when we can learn by reason and
judgment and understanding and faith that all life is worth
saving, and that mercy is the highest attribute of man." 245 In the
end, I believe justice must be melded with mercy as our
civilization marches to define our evolving standards of decency.

245 CLARENCE DARROW, ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED: CLARENCE DARROW IN
THE COURTROOM 86-87 (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1957). For more information on the
life of Clarence Darrow, see KEVIN TIERNEY, DARROW: A BIOGRAPHY (1979).
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